



Institute of English Studies  
University of Warsaw

# **Interpreting for Relevance: Discourse and Translation**



Conference 7

29-30 September 2014  
Warsaw, Poland

## ***Book of Abstracts***

edited by  
Ewa Wałaszewska  
and Agnieszka Piskorska



## Conference Programme

<b>Monday, September 29</b>		
<b>9:00 – 9:45</b>	<b>Registration</b>	
<b>9:45 – 10:00</b> Room 111	<b>Opening of the conference</b>	
<b>10:00 – 11:00</b> Room 111	<b>Plenary I</b> <b>Deirdre Wilson</b> Irony, hyperbole, jokes and banter	
<b>11:00 – 11:30</b>	<b>Coffee break</b>	
<b>11:30 – 13:00</b>	<b>SECTION I (Room 111)</b> <b>Chair: Daniel Sax</b>	<b>SECTION II (Room 113)</b> <b>Chair: Maria Jodłowiec</b>
11:30 – 12:00	<b>Manuel Padilla Cruz</b> Participial adjectives and epistemic vigilance	<b>Magdalena Biegajło</b> Humour phenomena in sitcom: On addressing categories of humour pivoted on creativity in the creation of humorous effects
12:00 – 12:30	<b>Regina Blass</b> German evidential procedural indicators <i>ja</i> and <i>wohl</i> in comprehension and argumentation	<b>Samuel Zakowski</b> 'Here's another hit, Barry Bonds'. Relevance theory & hip hop's punch line flow
12:30 – 13:00	<b>Sarah Casson</b> The Greek connective <i>gar</i> : Procedural meaning and persuasion. Different genres, different effects?	<b>Agnieszka Solska</b> Tropes of ill repute: puns and (thwarted) expectations of relevance
<b>13:00 – 14:00</b>	<b>Lunch</b>	
<b>14:00 – 15:00</b> Room 111	<b>Plenary II</b> <b>Alison Hall</b> The interpretation of subsentential utterances: A pragmatic approach	
<b>15:00 – 16:30</b>	<b>SECTION I (Room 111)</b> <b>Chair: Kamila Dębowska-Kozłowska</b>	<b>SECTION II (Room 113)</b> <b>Chair: Agnieszka Piskorska</b>
15:00 – 15:30	<b>Kate Scott</b> Communicating with a personal style on the World Wide Web: #context	<b>Jerzy Warakomski</b> Irony on the air
15:30 – 16:00	<b>Stephen Jones</b> Classifier constructions as procedural referring expressions in American Sign Language	<b>Maria Angeles Ruiz-Moneva</b> Intercultural misunderstandings as a source of humour and irony in George Mikes' <i>How to beat a Brit</i> : A relevance-theoretical approach
16:00 – 16:30	<b>Ryoko Sasamoto and Minako O'Hagan</b> Relevance, style and multimodality: Typographical features as stylistic devices	<b>Agnieszka Piskorska</b> What ironic utterances do not communicate to irony-blind individuals
<b>16:30 – 17:00</b>	<b>Coffee break</b>	
<b>17:00 – 18:00</b>	<b>SECTION I (Room 111)</b> <b>Chair: Katarzyna Bromberek-Dyzman</b>	<b>SECTION II (Room 113)</b> <b>Chair: Marta Kisielewska-Krysiuk</b>
17:00 – 17:30	<b>Rebecca Jackson</b> The role of intonation boundaries in the interpretation of spoken epizeuxis	<b>Kaja Borthen</b> A relevance-theoretic analysis of the Norwegian tag <i>da</i>
17:30 – 18:00	<b>Cláudia Strey</b> Prosody and modal verb reading: The case of Brazilian Portuguese	<b>Beate Lubberger and Regina Blass</b> The procedural marker <i>loo</i> in Indus Kohistani as an indicator of desirable utterances
<b>19:00</b>	<b>Conference dinner</b>	



<b>Tuesday, September 30</b>	
<b>9:00 -10:00</b> Room 111	<b>Plenary III</b> <b>Billy Clark</b> Beyond comprehension, beyond interpretation: Relevance-theoretic stylistics
<b>10:00 – 11:00</b>	<b>SECTION I (Room 111)</b> <b>Chair: Agnieszka Solska</b>
10:00 – 10:30	<b>Katarzyna Bromberek-Dyzman</b> Irony on-line computation. Does the experimental task matter?
10:30 – 11:00	<b>Herbert L. Colston</b> Styles of persuasion: Hyperbole, relevance theory and cognitive side effects
<b>11:00 – 11:30</b>	<b>Coffee break</b>
<b>11:30 – 13:00</b>	<b>SECTION I (Room 111)</b> <b>Chair: Ewa Wałaszewska</b>
11:30 – 12:00	<b>Kamila Dębowska-Kozłowska</b> The cognitive account of the fallaciousness of argumentation
12:00 – 12:30	<b>Marta Kisielewska-Krysiuk</b> Lying and the explicit-implicit distinction
12:30 – 13:00	<b>Maria Jodłowiec</b> How explicit are explicatures that interpreters recover
<b>13:00 – 14:00</b>	<b>Lunch</b>
<b>14:00 – 15:00</b> Room 111	<b>Plenary IV</b> <b>Jadwiga Linde-Usiekiewicz</b> Towards a relevance theory account of hate speech
<b>15:00 – 16:30</b>	<b>SECTION I (Room 111)</b> <b>Chair: Iwona Witzak-Plisiecka</b>
15:00 – 15:30	<b>Maria Jodłowiec and Agnieszka Piskorska</b> Metonymic relations – from full determinacy to underdeterminacy
15:30 – 16:00	<b>Ewa Mioduszewska</b> Analogy and concept-relatedness in relevance theory
16:00 – 16:30	<b>Ewa Wałaszewska</b> Hedges and lexical concept adjustment
<b>16:30 – 17:00</b>	<b>Coffee break</b>



<b>17:00 – 18:30</b>	<b>SECTION I (Room 111)</b> <b>Chair: Regina Blass</b>	<b>SECTION II (Room 113)</b> <b>Chair: Manuel Padilla Cruz</b>	
17:00 – 17:30	<b>Anabella Niculescu-Gorpin</b> A relevance-theoretic approach to stylistic choices in mother and child related discourse	17:00 – 18:00	<b>Vladimir Žegarac and Joanna Bhatti</b> Modern pragmatics as the literary theory theory
17:30 – 18:00	<b>Iwona Witzak-Plisiecka</b> Legal language – amidst the literal and the metaphorical		
18:00 – 18:30	<b>Clene Nyiramahoro</b> Understanding cultural ethos of conflict through Kinyarwanda proverbs		
18:30	<b>Closing of the conference</b>		



## Plenary Speakers

### Billy Clark

Middlesex University, UK  
b.clark@mdx.ac.uk

### **Beyond comprehension, beyond interpretation: Relevance-theoretic stylistics**

This paper considers some of the ways in which ideas from relevance theory have contributed to work in stylistics and sketches some directions for future work. It argues that a focus on inference is an important component of any stylistic analysis, even when not explicitly discussed, and that this approach is applicable not only in explaining how texts are interpreted but also in accounting for their production, their evaluation, and literary influence.

A key idea within relevance theory is a distinction between utterance comprehension (which involves recognising a communicator's communicative intentions) and utterance interpretation (which goes beyond these intentions to derive effects not intended by communicators). Wilson (2011) points out the importance of this distinction for accounts of literary interpretation, pointing out that interpretation regularly goes beyond comprehension for both literary and non-literary texts. Furlong (1996, 2007, 2011) argues that what she terms 'non-spontaneous interpretation' is particularly important in understanding literariness. Interpretations are non-spontaneous to the extent that they involve going beyond initial hypotheses to consider further evidence. Interpretations of any communicative act can be more or less spontaneous. While relatively non-spontaneous interpretations are typically associated with texts perceived as literary, non-literary texts can be the objects of fairly non-spontaneous interpretations and literary texts can be the object of fairly spontaneous ones.

Relevance theory goes beyond utterance comprehension in accounting for the effects of specific texts and textual phenomena. Work in relevance-theoretic stylistics also goes beyond interpretation in considering more theoretical questions about, for the example, the nature of literariness (as discussed by Furlong) and 'poetic' or 'aesthetic' effects (Pilkington 2000). This paper considers how ideas from relevance theory can also be applied in accounting for textual production (writing and editing), evaluation and literary influence. It considers how models of inferences made by writers and editors can help to account for textual production (Clark 2012) and to develop individual practice (Clark and Owtram 2012). It considers the role of inference in developing formal and informal evaluations (Clark 2014). Finally, it considers some ways in which pragmatic theories can be applied in accounting for literary influence.

### References:

- Clark, Billy. 2012. Beginning with 'One More Thing': Pragmatics and editorial intervention in the work of Raymond Carver. *Journal of Literary Semantics* 41, no. 2: 155-173.
- . 2014. Before and after Chekhov: Inference, interpretation and evaluation. In *Pragmatic literary stylistics*, edited by S. Chapman and B. Clark. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 55-69.
- Clark, Billy and Nicola Owtram. 2012. Imagined inference: Teaching writers to think like readers. In *Current trends in pedagogical stylistics*, edited by M. Burke, S. Czabo, L. Week and J. Berkowitz. London: Continuum, 126-141.
- Furlong, Anne. 1996. Relevance theory and literary interpretation. PhD Thesis. University College London, London.
- . 2007. A modest proposal: Linguistics and literary studies. *Canadian Journal of Applied Linguistics* 10, no. 3: 325-347.
- . 2011. The soul of wit. *Language and Literature* 20: 136-150.
- Pilkington, Adrian. 2000. *Poetic effects*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. [1986] 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Wilson, Deirdre. 2011. Relevance theory and the interpretation of literary works. *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* 23: 69-80.  
Available at: <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/psychlangsci/research/linguistics/publications/uclwpl23>



## **Alison Hall**

University College London, UK  
a.hall@ucl.ac.uk

### **The interpretation of subsentential utterances: A pragmatic approach**

In this talk I consider two varieties of ‘fragment’: discourse-initial subsentential phrases such as “*The third from the right*”, and fragment answers such as B’s reply in this dialogue: A: “*What did you buy?*” B: “*A new car.*” I defend the idea that these are syntactically subsentential, and often pragmatically enriched into a proposition. I respond to arguments from connectivity effects such as case-marking, which are standardly appealed to as evidence that such utterances have sentential – but elided – syntactic structure. I suggest instead that such phenomena should be treated as playing a pragmatic role. I also consider subsentential utterances where there is no determinate proposition expressed, and how they can be accommodated in an account that appeals to the relevance-theoretic idea of degrees of explicitness.

## **Jadwiga Linde-Usiekiewicz**

University of Warsaw, Poland  
jlinde@uw.edu.pl

### **Towards a relevance theory account of hate speech**

The objective of this talk is to explore the possibility of applying relevance-theoretic analysis to the phenomenon of hate speech. Generally, and outside law, hate speech is defined as “speech that attacks a person or group on the basis of race, religion, gender, or sexual orientation” (*Random House Dictionary*). A part of hate-speech phenomena is composed of slurs, i.e. “derogatory terms targeting individuals and groups of individuals on the basis of race, nationality, religion, gender or sexual orientation” (Bianchi 2014, 35), but the phenomenon is not restricted to the use of such terms. “In legal literature, hate speech commonly refers to incitement to hatred or discrimination against persons because they belong to a certain group, such as race/ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation or gender” (Noorloss 2011, 4), from which it follows that different kind of utterances may qualify as hate speech.

As a social, psychological and legal phenomenon hate speech has been studied in various frameworks offered by relevant disciplines, with most famous account being Judith Butler’s (1997) analysis of hate speech in terms of Austinian speech act theory. In Poland, besides work that monitor hate speech and focus on its contents (Kowalski and Tulli 2003; Czarnecki 2009; Bilewicz et al. 2014), it was proposed that hate speech should be analyzed within Critical Discourse Analysis (Nijalkowski 2008). Intriguingly, less attention has been paid to the possibility of accounting for hate speech phenomena in linguistic terms, and specifically distinguishing hate speech from other offensive and aggressive verbal behavior (Cegiela 2014).

At first glance relevance theory seems an unsuitable framework for analyzing utterances that carry the negative emotional load of hatred or incitement to hatred. First of all, RT focuses on informative aspects of verbal communication and cognition, with emotions being viewed as something external to cognition (Piskorska 2012, 107). In addition, in most RT work the speaker is construed as more often collaborative than not. The only instance she is seen differently is when the notion of epistemic vigilance is invoked (Sperber et al. 2010; Mazzarella 2013). However, in these accounts the possible alternative to the competence and benevolence of the speaker is her communicative incompetence and malevolence: yet malevolence is not understood as hostility but as intention to misinform.

Nevertheless, hate speech utterances are instances of ostensive-inferential communication. Some of the utterances are not linguistic at all (swastikas, pigs drawn on the wall of a mosque, etc.). Linguistic hate speech may have the “hate” component as decodable or explicit meaning, e.g. when at a football match against Widzew, the supporters of the opposite team chanted “*Hamas, Hamas, Juden auf den Gas.*” Interestingly, in the case of this football rant, the Prosecutor’s office initially declined to prosecute. They argued that the chant was directed against the Widzew team, usually referred to as “*Jews*” by opposing teams, so it did not qualify as an attack on Jews as such. (In RT terms here the Prosecutor’s office deemed the inferred meaning, arrived at through contextual resolving of referential ambiguity, as the one at which the expectation of relevance is satisfied and the processing stops, and as the ‘right’ meaning of the utterance). On the other hand, there are some instances where the Prosecutor’s office declined to prosecute hate speech, in proffering in justification an analysis that completely overlooked the contents of the utterance. That was the case of swastikas painted on



buildings in walls, where the Prosecutor's office claimed that a swastika was an ambiguous symbol, among others, a symbol of good luck in Hinduism.

The claim presented here is that hate speech is the kind of ostensive behavior that requires being processed together with some assumptions about generalized inferiority of a group of people by virtue of their race, ethnicity, faith/atheism, gender, sexual orientation, sexual identity, etc. for greatest (tentatively optimal) relevance. In addition, these assumptions must be widely accessible to the audience. In other terms, hate speech only works if there is an appropriate set of assumptions, available or manifest. These assumptions usually would correspond to what is otherwise considered prejudices, but in order to process adequately the utterance in question one does not need to entertain them as intuitive beliefs; they may just as well be reflective beliefs only (Sperber 1997).

It will be argued that both the audiences that hold the assumptions about inferiority of the targeted group as their intuitive beliefs, and thus consider hate speech as valid, cooperative and informative communication, and the audiences that entertain them as reflective ones only, and even consider them blatantly false and at the same time offensive (the latter include the targeted group itself) follow the same relevance-guided comprehension procedure, i.e.:

- a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretative hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.
- b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied. (Wilson and Sperber 2004, 613)

The obvious differences in comprehension, inferences and resulting mental representations and judgment arise from the relative accessibility of assumptions, premises and implicatures implied in processing of the same utterance by different audiences.

#### References:

- Bianchi, Claudia. 2014. Slurs and appropriation: An echoic account. *Journal of Pragmatics* 66: 35-44.
- Bilewicz, Michał et al. 2014. *Mowa nienawiści. Raport z badań sondażowych*. Warsaw: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego.
- Butler, Judith. 1997. *Excitable speech. A politics of the performative*. New York: Routledge.
- Cegiela, Anna. 2014. *Słowa i ludzie. Wprowadzenie do etyki słowa*. Warszawa: Elipsa.
- Czarnecki, Greg. (ed.). 2009. *Raport o homofobicznej mowie nienawiści w Polsce*. Warsaw: Kampania przeciw homofobii.
- Kowalski, Sergiusz and Magdalena Tulli. 2003. *Zamiast procesu. Raport o mowie nienawiści*. Warsaw: WAB.
- Mazzarella, Diana. 2013. 'Optimal relevance' as a pragmatic criterion: The role of epistemic vigilance. *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* 35: 20-45.
- Nijałkowski, Lech M. 2008. Mowa nienawiści w świetle teorii dyskursu. In *Analiza dyskursu w socjologii i dla socjologii*, edited by A. Horolets. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 113-133.
- van Noorloss, Marloes. 2011. *Hate speech revisited. A comparative and historical perspective on hate speech law in the Netherlands and England & Wales*. Cambridge UK and Portland (Or.): Intersentia.
- Piskorska, Agnieszka. 2012. Cognition and emotions – a joint effort at obtaining positive cognitive effects? In *Relevance studies in Poland. Volume 4. Essays on language and communication*, edited by A. Piskorska. Warsaw, WUW, 102-111.
- Sperber, Dan. 1997. Intuitive and reflective beliefs. *Mind and Language* 12, no. 1: 67-83.
- Sperber Dan et al. 2010. Epistemic vigilance. *Mind & Language* 24, no. 4: 359-393.
- Wilson Deirdre and Dan Sperber. 2004. Relevance theory. In *The handbook of pragmatics*, edited by L. Horn and G. Ward. Oxford: Blackwell, 607-632.

#### Deirdre Wilson

UCL, UK and CSMN, Oslo  
deirdre.wilson@ucl.ac.uk

### Irony, hyperbole, jokes and banter

In the last ten or fifteen years, following the collapse of the traditional definition of verbal irony as a matter of saying one thing and meaning the opposite, a range of disparate phenomena including hyperbole, banter, understatement, jokes and rhetorical questions have been commonly treated as forms of verbal irony in the experimental literature. Ray Gibbs (2000/2007, 342), whose pioneering experimental studies of rhetoric and



poetics have been deservedly influential, sees this as “an important challenge for cognitive science theories of irony. Is it necessarily the case that a single theory will account for the multiple forms and functions of irony in ordinary speech?” After illustrating how this broadened notion of irony is being used in current experimental studies and outlining some distinctive features of typical cases of verbal irony, I will argue that hyperbole, banter, understatement, jokes and rhetorical questions are not inherently ironical, and routinely including them in the data for experimental studies of irony comprehension distorts the results and obscures our understanding of irony.

## Parallel Sessions

### Magdalena Biegajło

University of Warsaw, Poland  
magdalena.biegajlo@gmail.com

### Humour phenomena in sitcom: On addressing categories of humour pivoted on creativity in the creation of humorous effects

Whilst the theory of relevance (Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995, 2004) has opened up a whole gamut of analyses, proposals and postulates of humour discourse, more specifically jokes (Yus 2003), puns (Solska 2012), stand-up performances (Yus 2002) or longer humorous texts (Larkin Galiñanes 2000), the research into fictional media discourse is rather scarce (Hu 2012).

The paramount objective of this presentation is to demonstrate and discuss an array of intentionally produced humorous verbalisations, on the strength of pivotal relevance-theoretic notions, i.e. context and co-text, cognitive effects vs. mental effort, the communicative and informative intentions, optimal relevance, mutual manifestness, and ostension, among others. To meet the goal, the author concentrates on the character's overt intentions which are produced to amuse the recipient, as constructed by the production crew. It is here maintained that film discourse is contingent on the two levels of humorous intentions – the communicative (inter-characters') level, consisting of dialogues, monologues and polylogues, and the recipient's level (2011a). Hence, there are two layers of humorous intentions, viz. fictional characters' and film crew's, with the latter being in the centre of this presentation since some instances of humour are tailored to amuse the viewer, but not the character. In other words, attention will be devoted to what is going on at production crew's layer because a considerable number of humorous utterances do not induce laughter on the character's part but may be perceived as funny by the audience.

The presentation will be illustrated with extracts from an American television sitcom entitled “Modern Family”, which belongs to the genre of mock documentaries. One of the peculiarities of the sitcom is that humorous instances which are subject to scholarly investigation may be divided into two types: first, regular dialogues among the characters, and second, comments uttered directly into the camera which frequently create parody. In the course of gathering data, it has been noticed that humour repeatedly results from stupidity of the main character, which is sometimes coupled with the creative use of words.

#### References:

- Dynel, Marta. 2011. “I'll be there for you!” On the participation-based sitcom humour. In *The pragmatics of humour across discourse domains*, edited by M. Dynel. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 311-333.
- Hu, Shuqin. 2012. An analysis of humor in *The Big Bang Theory* from pragmatic perspectives. *Theory and Practice in Language Studies* 2, no. 6: 1185-1190.
- Larkin Galiñanes, Cristina. 2000. Relevance theory, humour, and the narrative structure of humorous novels. *Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses* 13: 95-106.
- Solska, Agnieszka. 2012. Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure and processing multiple meanings in paradigmatic puns. In *Relevance theory: More than understanding*, edited by E. Wałaszewska and A. Piskorska. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 167-182.
- Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. [1986] 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber. 2004. Relevance theory. *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* 14: 249-287.



- Yus, Francisco. 2002. Stand-up comedy and cultural spread: The case of sex roles. *Babel A.F.I.A.L.* (special issue on humour studies): 245-292.
- . 2003. Humour and the search for relevance. *Journal of Pragmatics* 35, no. 9: 1295-1331.

## Regina Blass

Africa International University and University of North Dakota, US  
regina\_blass@sil.org

### German evidential procedural indicators *ja* and *wohl* in comprehension and argumentation

*Ja* and *wohl* in German have traditionally been analysed as modal particles. Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Ifanditou (1994) analyse evidential markers as procedural indicators encouraging the construction of a Higher Level Explicature. I will argue that *ja* and *wohl* are such procedural indicators functioning on Higher Level Explicature with an evidential use. They indicate that the speaker as well as the hearer have full evidence in the case of *ja* or some evidence in the case of *wohl* for the reliability of the source or the content of the proposition expressed.

The evidence can be explained in terms of Sperber and Wilson's notion of mutual manifestness. The communicator signals to the addressee that what he is saying is also manifest to her. The manifestness can be of many different kinds: It can be from memory, the physical environment or through deduction.

*Ja* and *wohl* play a role in utterance understanding, as outlined above, but they are also having an important function in argumentation, namely to persuade the addressees to believe the content of the proposition expressed. In argumentative terms *ja* and *wohl* have the function of helping to overcome the addressee's vigilance. Wilson (2011, 20-21) claims:

A speaker producing an utterance has two distinct goals: to get the hearer to understand her meaning, and to persuade him to believe it. The hearer has two corresponding tasks: to understand the speaker's meaning, and to decide whether to believe it. The first task involves the pragmatic ability to infer the speaker's meaning from linguistic and contextual cues. The second involves what Sperber et al. (2010) call a capacity for 'epistemic vigilance' which enables hearers to avoid being accidentally or intentionally misinformed.  
...epistemic vigilance mechanisms fall into two broad groups: there are procedures for assessing the reliability of the *source* of communicated information (i.e. deciding who to believe) and procedures for assessing the reliability of the *content* (i.e. deciding what to believe).

My claim will be that *ja* and *wohl* may provide procedures for assessing the reliability of the *source* or/and the *content*. Consider example (1) and (2)

- (1) A: John can present well.  
B: Das sagen *ja* alle (Source)  
'After all (of course) everybody is saying this.'
- (2) A: Shall we buy strawberries or grapes?  
B: Erdbeeren, weil es *ja* die Jahreszeit dafür ist. (Content)  
'Strawberries, after all, they are in season.'

Wilson (2011) assumes that evidentials mainly contribute to the reliability of the source. However, *ja* and *wohl* which are clearly evidentials may contribute to both, content and source.

In discourse these indicators occur often when the communicator is eager to support his own views in a situation where communicators and addressees have quite different views. Often they portray a confirmation bias, where the communicator uses all means to persuade, whether the so-called *evidence* is truthful and rational or not. So the evidence of *ja* and *wohl* can be faked.



## Kaja Borthen

Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim  
kaja.borthen@ntnu.no

### A relevance-theoretic analysis of the Norwegian tag ‘da’

The Norwegian tag *da* is a frequently used word that contributes to coherence in Norwegian oral discourse. Seemingly, it changes its meaning from utterance type to utterance type and is thus a candidate for lexical ambiguity. The claim in this paper is that all uses are due to one unitary semantics in combination with pragmatic enrichment.

In Borthen (forthcoming) the meaning of ‘da’ was investigated based on 225 authentic occurrences in natural discourse. The investigation revealed that *da* occurred systematically in seven prominent discourse patterns, i.e. seven utterance types systematically mapped onto certain effects of *da*. Although seemingly distinct, all seven uses are argued to be captured under one semantic description:

- (1) **For an utterance that contains the tag ‘da’, expresses the proposition  $p$  and is used to communicate the speech act  $s(p)$ :**
- Part 1: Derive an implicature  $s(p)$  since  $\{q, r, \dots, n\}$  where  $\{q, r, \dots, n\}$  are implicitly accessible assumptions.
  - Part 2: Interpret the utterance in light of the assumption that there are opposing views on some accessible assumption.

Informally, this says: “Assume that the utterance’s speech act is contextually motivated, and assume that there are opposing views”. For a question with the tag *da* attached, this may lead to an interpretation such as “I ask you this since you have suggested it is the case whereas I doubt it”; for an imperative “I encourage you to do this since there are good reasons for me to want this whereas you have not done it yet”; and for a declarative “In spite of some arguments to the opposite, I conclude this since we have just seen evidence in favor of it”. What is constant across utterance types is the existence of a contextual motivation for the speech act; what varies is the motivation’s source and where the contrast lies.

Although the analysis in (1) bears on important relevance-theoretic categories, Borthen (forthcoming) does not place (1) sufficiently in the relevance-theoretic tradition of analyses of procedural words (e.g. Blakemore 1987; Wilson and Sperber 1993), which will be the main focus of the present paper. The analysis in (1) will be contrasted with the analysis of *da* proposed by Fretheim (2014). According to Fretheim, *da* has the procedural meaning “Test for relevance the assumption that the expressed proposition  $p$  is mutually manifest”. Authentic data show that the proposition modified by *da* is mutually manifest to speaker and hearer in most cases – this follows from (1). However, as will be shown in the presentation, mutual manifestness is not a sufficient condition for the use of *da*.

#### References:

- Borthen, Kaja. Forthcoming. Hva betyr ‘da’, da? To appear in *Norsk Lingvistisk Tidsskrift*.  
Blakemore, Diane. 1987. *Semantic Constraints on Relevance*. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Fretheim, Thorstein. 2014. A relevance-theoretic perspective on the Norwegian utterance-final particles *da* and *altså* compared to their English counterpart *then*. In *Sentence-final particles*, edited by S. Hancil and M. Post. De Gruyter.  
Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber. 1993. Linguistic form and relevance. *Lingua* 90: 1-25.

## Katarzyna Bromberek-Dyzman

Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland  
kasia.dyzman@wa.amu.edu.pl

### Irony on-line computation. Does the experimental task matter?

Extant irony processing research keeps providing conflicting evidence on online irony computation. One line of experimental research shows that irony may be processed faster, or as fast as its non-ironic equivalents (e.g. Gibbs 1986; Ivanko and Pexman 2003; Bromberek-Dyzman 2014), another line of research presents results



showing that irony is always processed longer than its literal equivalents (e.g. Giora et al. 1998; Giora and Fein 1999; Giora et al. 2007).

In order to account for the contradictory results a behavioral study was designed to test the role of the task participants perform and the timing they are provided to make the experimental decisions. A total of 145 participants took part in a study consisting of two experiments testing ironic praise and ironic criticism against literal praise and literal criticism in two timing conditions, and performed two different computational tasks, yet based on the same set of experimental stimuli. In experiment 1 (self-paced) a group of 78 participants was asked to decide whether the utterance paraphrase provided was true. In experiment 2 (speeded response), a group of 67 participants were asked to decide whether the utterance comment was favorable or not.

The results clearly show that task and timing in irony on-line processing matter. While utterance paraphrasing decision showed that irony (praise, criticism) is processed significantly longer than non-irony (literal praise, criticism), emotive decision on the final comment in ironic and non-ironic messages showed that favorable comments, both literal praise and ironic criticism (e.g. *Gambling is a great way to make money*), are processed significantly faster than unfavorable comments – literal criticism, ironic praise (e.g. *Life is going to be primitive on this vacation*).

These results point to the utterance scope (entire utterance, final comment) and the computational timing (self-paced, imposed-pace) as critically relevant aspects of ironic messages processing. While in the task based on the entire utterance computation irony is processed longer than non-ironic equivalents, the computational focus on the terminal comment of ironic message, shows critical irony to be processed faster than literal criticism, and praising irony to be processed longer than literal praise. These results offer a conciliatory perspective on the extant, so far conflicting irony processing research, and show that irony online computation is more time and task dependent than has been so far considered.

#### References:

- Bromberek-Dyzman, K. 2014. *Attitude and language. On explicit and implicit attitudinal meaning processing*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM.
- Gibbs, R. 1986. On the psycholinguistics of sarcasm. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 115: 3-15.
- Giora, R. et al. 1998. Irony: Graded salience and indirect negation. *Metaphor and Symbol* 13: 83-101.
- Giora, R. and O. Fein 1999. Irony: Context and salience. *Metaphor and Symbol* 14: 241-257.
- Giora et al. 2007. Expecting irony: Context versus salience-based effects. *Metaphor and Symbol* 22: 119-146.
- Ivanko, S. and P. Pexman 2003. Context incongruity and irony processing. *Discourse Processes* 35: 241-279.

#### Sarah Casson

King's College, London, UK and SIL International  
sarah\_casson@sil.org

### **The Greek connective *gar*: Procedural meaning and persuasion. Different genres, different effects?**

The precise function of the Ancient Greek connective *gar*, traditionally but unsatisfactorily glossed as ‘for’, continues to pose problems for interpreters of the New Testament. A relevance-theoretic procedural analysis such as the one suggested by Blass (1998) opens the way for a unified explanation of *gar*. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the contribution the connective makes to narrative texts, where it is relatively uncommon, and didactic and argumentative texts, where it is more prominent and might be seen as contributing to persuasiveness. This paper explores whether *gar*'s varied use contributes to different stylistic effects in different genres. Our suggestion, following Unger's (2012) insights into procedural indicators, is that the connective interacts with the inferential comprehension module in narrative, but in argumentation may trigger the argumentative module by which the hearer exercises epistemic vigilance. It seems intuitive that hearers will have different expectations of “factuality” and “believability” from narrative than from argumentation, and that the argumentative module will thus be activated more often in the interpretation of the latter. We suggest that the perceived differences in stylistic effects caused by *gar*'s use in these genres might be explained in terms of the different modules triggered during interpretation.



**Herbert L. Colston**

University of Alberta, Canada  
colston@ualberta.ca

## **Styles of persuasion: Hyperbole, relevance theory and cognitive side effects**

Previous research on hyperbole, or expressions involving inflation or deflation of a magnitude (aside from metaphor [Carston and Wearing 2011; Deamer, Pouscoulous and Breheny 2010; Niculescu-Gorpin 2010; Rubio-Fernandez, Wearing and Carston 2013]), have shown it is frequently used; 1) to express a **violation of expectations** (Colston 1997; Colston and Keller 1998; Carston and Wearing 2011), and 2) as a form of **complaint** (Colston 2007). In essence, events occasionally don't turn out as they should, people are dismayed over this, and they use hyperbole to express it. An open question though, concerns how successful hyperbole is at convincing others that a given violation of expectations is *worthy* of complaint. Or put differently, does hyperbole convince others that some deviance from expectations that a speaker doesn't like needs expression, is unjustified, should be somehow actionable etc.? If so, how does hyperbole accomplish this?

How persuasion is accomplished by speakers who use hyperbole in response to accusations of wrong-doing was thus investigated in production tasks using relatively authentic data, and experiments that used experimenter-created utterances.

Results revealed a dissociation—when speakers accused of wrong-doing (e.g., “Did you leave the oven on last night?”), respond with authentic denials of the accusations, either when truthfully speaking (e.g., the speakers did not commit the wrong-doing) or when lying (e.g., the speakers *did* commit the act in the accusation), speakers use more hyperbole when telling the truth (i.e., when they are innocent). Moreover, when these authentic utterances are then given to experimental participants who rate the speakers' innocence or guilt, the hyperbole is taken to indicate relative innocence. Hyperbole thus appears to succeed at persuasion in these contexts.

But when an analogous gradient of hyperbole is explicitly manipulated in experimental utterances by fictional speakers denying similar accusations of wrong-doing, and participants are asked to rate those speakers' relative innocence or guilt, greater hyperbole is thought to indicate relative guilt. In these contexts, hyperbole thus appears to fail at persuasion.

Additional investigation of both the authentic and experimental utterances reveals empirical evidence to confirm the role of *hyperbole stealth* as a mediating factor in this dissociation—to the extent that hyperbole resides stealthily within structural and propositional characteristics of host utterances (e.g., coheres with MODAL VERB/EXTREME CASE FORMULATION/OBJECT constructions, isn't redundant, etc.), it succeeds at persuasion.

Two additional mediating factors; relevance and cognitive side-effects, are also considered. The implication of the results for accounts of figurative language comprehension and persuasion (i.e., relevance theory) are provided. The relative contributions of authentic versus experimentally-crafted data are also briefly discussed.

### **References:**

- Carston, R. and C. Wearing. 2011. Metaphor, hyperbole and simile: A pragmatic approach. *Language and Cognition* 3, no. 2: 283-312.
- Colston, H. L. 1997. “I've never seen anything like it”: Overstatement, understatement and irony. *Metaphor and Symbol* 12, no. 1: 43-58.
- . 2007. What figurative language development reveals about the mind. In *Mental states. Volume 2: Language and cognitive structure*, edited by A. C. Schalley and D. Khlentzos. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 191-212.
- Colston, H. L. and S. B. Keller. 1998. You'll never believe this: Irony and hyperbole in expressing surprise. *Journal of Psycholinguistic Research* 27, no. 4: 499-513.
- Deamer, F., N. Pouscoulous and R. Breheny. 2010. A contrastive look at metaphor and hyperbole. *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* 22: 1-15.
- Niculescu-Gorpin, A. G. 2010. Is there a continuum between literal use, approximation, hyperbole and metaphor? In *Relevance studies in Poland. Volume 2: Exploring translation and communication problems*, edited by M. Kisieleska-Krysiuk, A. Piskorska and E. Walaszewska. Warsaw University Press, 140-152.
- Rubio-Fernandez, P., C. Wearing and R. Carston. 2013. How metaphor and hyperbole differ: An empirical investigation of the relevance-theoretic account of loose use. *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* 25: 46-66.



## **Kamila Dębowska-Kozłowska**

Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland  
kamila@wa.amu.edu.pl

### **The cognitive account of the fallaciousness of argumentation**

The paper explains how the notion of informal fallacy is traditionally defined and proposes to reconsider the definition taking into account the cognitive processing of an argument by a participant of a dialogical exchange. The cognitive process of the evaluation of the degree of fallaciousness is discussed with reference to Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986; Wilson and Sperber 2006) and the Argumentative Theory of Reasoning (Mercier and Sperber 2009, 2011; Mercier 2012). In the proposed cognitive approach, the evaluation of the fallaciousness of an argument is allocated to a hearer of the message and does not rely on the traditional account of informal fallacies. With the help of two theories, i.e. RT and the ATR, I explain in what way the hearer of the argument gauges the consistency of the message and the trustworthiness of a speaker. I argue that the evaluation of those two dimensions, i.e. consistency and trustworthiness, by the hearer is to be treated as a means for indicating reasonableness of an argument from the cognitive perspective. I show that intuitive and reflective types of inferencing discussed in RT and the ATR respectively are needed for the cognitive processing of an argumentative message. I also point out that the reflective inferencing is responsible for the final indication of a degree of unreasonableness of the argument. The main focus is put here on the notion of epistemic vigilance discussed in the ATR. Epistemic vigilance is treated as a cognitive device of a hearer which helps him trace inconsistencies in the content and structure of speaker's single and compound argumentation and evaluate any aspect of untrustworthiness of the speaker. I put forward that exercising epistemic vigilance is based not only on epistemic rationality but also on instrumental rationality (Over 2004; Stanovich 2011). I indicate that the traditional view of fallacies is related to the epistemic type of rationality which assumes that people's behaviour is considered rational when they follow the principles of logic or rules specified by a given normative system. Instrumental type of rationality discusses rationality in relation to an individual's goal. The paper attempts to show that in the process of the recognition of inconsistencies and trustworthiness hearers consider both those principles of logic and rules of argumentative behaviour of which they are aware and possible goals of their opponents. Since hearers do not perform in the same way due to individual differences in cognitive abilities and styles, the cognitive account of the degree of fallaciousness of argumentation needs also to be related those individual differences influencing intuitive and reflective inferencing.

## **Rebecca Jackson**

University of Salford, UK  
r.c.jackson1@edu.salford.ac.uk

### **The role of intonation boundaries in the interpretation of spoken epizeuxis**

Epizeuxis is defined as the immediate repetition of words with *nothing in between* (Garner 2009; Malmkjaer 2004). Consider, however, the form of (1) and (2):

- (1) They were Greek students. | All of them, | all of them | Greek!
- (2) I love, | love, | love Malta!

I have found no definition of epizeuxis which mentions intonation boundaries. However, intonation boundaries are found in all spoken cases of epizeuxis (see above) and they *do* influence the interpretation of the repetition – compare (3a) and (3b):

- (3a) He was | tired tired tired |.
- (3b) He was tired, | tired, | tired |.

This paper examines spontaneous, spoken cases of epizeuxis. I explore the hypothesis that intonation boundaries in spoken epizeuxis suggest how repetitions should be optimally processed, and also guide the recovery of implicit content.

Working within relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), and following Wharton (2009) on *showing*, I



explore what IBs in spoken epizeuxis *do*. I ask how IBs in spoken epizeuxis emerge in the first place. Initial prosodic analyses reveal speakers can produce a highly ostensive nucleus in the first intonation boundary, which itself is repeated (placement, pitch height) in subsequent repeated segments. The repeated nuclei arise chiefly to contribute to non-propositional implicit content by (re)activating emotion-reading procedures. However, these highly-ostensive repeated nuclei also generate *emergent* IBs which are exploited by speakers to *show* what linguistic material has been repeated in the first place. Consequently, repetitions become easier to process, and boundaries then encourage hearers to search for weakly-communicated implicatures in one conceptual region.

This paper contributes to the relevance-theoretic discussion of style by demonstrating style *is* a matter of ostensive choices regarding linguistic form, but by showing style can also be a matter of speakers 'playing on' emergent and 'secondary' aspects of form to trigger recovery of additional stylistic effects.

#### References:

- Garner, B. 2009. *Garner's modern American usage*. OUP: Oxford.  
Malmkjaer, K. 2004. *Linguistics encyclopaedia*. Routledge: London.  
Sperber, D. and D. Wilson. 1995. *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Blackwell: Oxford.  
Wharton, T. 2009. *Pragmatics and non-verbal communication*. CUP: Cambridge.

#### Maria Jodłowiec

Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland  
maria.jodlowiec@uj.edu.pl

### How explicit are explicatures that interpreters recover

It is commonly accepted that utterance comprehension involves the formulation of a confirmed hypothesis about the speaker-intended meaning (Carston 2010). On the relevance-theoretic model, this hypothesis is constructed in the course of the relevance-guided utterance interpretation procedure: following the path of least effort, an interpreter adequately enriches the decoded linguistic meaning to arrive at the explicit content of the utterance and supplements it with implicatures until his expectations of relevance are satisfied (Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2004). All the underlying processes are inferential in nature and are assumed to run in parallel: an optimally relevant interpretation results from mutual adjustments among hypotheses about the explicitly and implicitly communicated meanings, which are adequately adjusted and fleshed out in the course of interpretation (Wilson and Sperber 2004; Wilson and Carston 2007). In this non-demonstrative inferential process the accessed contextual assumptions and recovered explicature warrant derived implicatures.

While it is standardly assumed by relevance theorists that depending on the amount of inferencing involved, explicatures may be more or less explicit (Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995), it will be argued that in certain communicative situations mere explicature schemas will be accessed by the interpreter. In other words, instead of a fully-fledged proposition, the interpreter may arrive at the overall optimally relevant interpretation without recovering a truth-evaluable explicit meaning as long as the pragmatic effects satisfying the recipient's optimal relevance expectations are all recoverable from this explicature schema. As it will be shown, this follows from certain theoretical assumptions of the relevance-theoretic framework, it is compatible with some of the analyses conducted along the relevance-theoretic lines, and it provides a natural explanation for important language users' intuitions.

#### Selected references:

- Carston, R. 2010. Explicit communication and 'free' pragmatic enrichment. In *Explicit communication: Robyn Carston's pragmatics*, edited by B. Soria and R. Romero. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 217-285.  
Sperber, D. and D. Wilson. [1986] 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Wilson, D. and R. Carston. 2007. A unitary approach to lexical pragmatics: Relevance, inference and ad hoc concepts. In *Pragmatics*, edited by N. Burton-Roberts. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 230-259.  
Wilson, D. and D. Sperber. 2004. Relevance theory. In *The handbook of pragmatics*, edited by L. Horn and G. Ward. Oxford: Blackwell, 607-632.

**Maria Jodłowiec**

Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland  
maria.jodlowiec@uj.edu.pl

**Agnieszka Piskorska**

University of Warsaw, Poland  
a.piskorska@uw.edu.pl

**Metonymic relations – from full determinacy to underdeterminacy**

This paper explores possible relations that might hold between encoded concepts and concepts actually communicated by metonymy. We adopt a traditional definition of metonymy as a figure of speech, typically used referentially, in which one entity stands for another in virtue of its salience rather than resemblance between the two entities. In relevance-theoretic terms, the encoded concept and the communicated concepts do not overlap so that the latter cannot be developed from the former in the process of ad hoc concept construction. Assuming the relevance-theoretic inferential model of utterance comprehension (Sperber and Wilson 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2004) and the deflationary view on figures of speech (Sperber and Wilson 2008), we treat metonymies as a non-natural class which shades off into other classes of non-literal uses of language and we see the metonymic relation as constrained by the regular inferential processes in which the interpretation of the utterance as a whole is warranted by the principle of relevance. The role of the metonymic concept is therefore to signal that the interpreter has to conceptualise the intended entity linked to that concept in such a way that the overall interpretation brings about the optimum balance of cognitive effects and effort. As the relevance-theoretic model of comprehension predicts, any encoded concept can be legitimately used to stand for the intended concept as long as the speaker represents the relationship as salient and can trust the hearer to recover the speaker-intended explicature and implicatures of the utterance with the metonymic relation as its element.

It follows that metonymic relations are not licensed by associative schemata such as PART FOR WHOLE. Though it is true that certain types of metonymic relations are more often exploited than others and may have become conventionalised, these schemata are merely attested regularities explained by analogy of experience and similarity of cognitive environments among humans.

We also wish to question the widespread view that the metonymic relation involves two specific entities, one mentioned and the other one meant. We argue that although in principle the metonymic concept can stand for a fully determinate communicated concept, in the majority of metonymic uses the encoded concept evokes a range of entities rather than one specific entity or that the conceptualisation of the referent is indeterminate. This kind of indeterminacy can be exploited in communication in different ways – sometimes it saves an effort of forming a specific conceptualisation (if that were to contribute no positive cognitive effects, the effort would be wasted) and sometimes it can be consciously exploited for the sake of stylistic effects.

**References:**

- Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Blackwell.  
— . 2008. A deflationary account of metaphor. In *The Cambridge handbook of metaphor and thought*, edited by R. Gibbs. Cambridge: CUP, 84-105.  
Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber. 2004. Relevance theory. In *The handbook of pragmatics*, edited by L. R. Horn and G. Ward. Oxford: Blackwell, 607-632.

**Stephen Jones**

Rochester Institute of Technology, US  
StephenPerryJones@gmail.com


**Classifier constructions as procedural referring expressions in American Sign Language**

Sign languages contain a highly productive system that denotes spatial relationships and movements using what has been called classifier constructions. There are many names for this sub-system found in all known sign languages. Through the application of Relevance Theory, I have found that this system of classifier constructions is comprised of procedural signs strung together to modify or manipulate previously established or highly accessible referents.

The handshapes in the classifier constructions provide an instruction to pick out a specific referent from context and then the interaction of the two hands and movement provide additional instructions on how to modify or manipulate a concept.

The conceptual sign, 'biking', in example (1) precedes classifier construction 'CC1'. The left hand provides the instruction to pick out a wide flat horizontal referent, in this case the driveway, while the right hand encodes the instruction to pick out a referent that is moving, which in context represents the person on the bike. The movement of the right hand expresses the interaction of the person on the bike and the driveway that was assigned referents through inference. Thus the movements must be interpreted from this context and represent moving forward down the driveway, over the curb, and down the street.


(1)  
(Bruce 2003)



"I rode my bike down the driveway, over the curb, and down the street."

The majority of the meaning in this sentence then comes from inference on the part of the addressee as they assign referents to the classifier construction and then come to conclusions as to what all of the movements mean. The concepts represented then are not encoded in the construction itself, but are inferred from the instructions given in the classifier construction and the preceding conceptual signs.

(2)  
(DawnSignPress 1992)



"We crawled into the small cave and continued forward on our stomachs."

The entire phrase in example (2) is comprised of classifier constructions. In (2) 'CC1' through 'CC5' take the previously established concept of cave and narrows it to a specific \*CAVE through providing instructions to the addressee by using classifier constructions. In 'CC1', the previously signed CA-V-E is narrowed to a specific \*CAVE with a small opening that required the 8 friends to crawl into it on their stomachs. 'CC2' narrows it further by indicating the small tunnel in which they crawled through. 'CC3' Show the people interacting with the cave by crawling on their stomach, while 'CC4' shows the people having to push forward hand over hand. 'CC5' continues to show the forward movement of the people in the cave with great difficulty. Another possible free translation to this phrase could be: "We crawled in to the small opening of the cave on our stomachs with barely enough room to squeeze in. The walls and ceiling left little room to move as we struggled forward deeper into the cave. We had to use our hands to propel ourselves forward with great difficulty and we slowly made forward progress deeper into the cave." No conceptual signs were used except for the signing of the word cave in the previous phrase.

### References:

- Bruce, Trix. 2003. The hearing world around me. Videorecording. TrixBruce.com Seattle, WA.  
DawnSignPress. 1992. Signing naturally. Level 2. Student videotext. Videorecording. Dawn Sign Press. Berkeley, CA.



**Marta Kisielewska-Krysiuk**

University of Warsaw, Poland  
m.kisielewska@uw.edu.pl

## **Lying and the explicit-implicit distinction**

The focus of the paper is on lying in explicit and implicit communication. Lying has been subject to extensive discussion and empirical analysis, and has received a number of various accounts in several fields of philosophy: Barnes 1994, Sorensen 2007, Martin 2009, Carson 2010, Saul 2012, to mention just a few. Within philosophy a lie has been classically defined in opposition to truth as saying something one believes to be false with the intent to deceive one's listener. Although lying has been viewed from a variety of perspectives (philosophy of language, ethics, sociology, psychology, etc.), there are relatively few linguistic accounts of the phenomenon. Part of the linguistic research concerning lying has been rooted in Paul Grice's inferential model of communication (e.g. Antas 2000; Meibauer 2005, 2011). As a component of his theory of conversation Grice (1975) postulated the Maxim of Quality, which requires that the speaker should make his contribution one that is true. i.e. should not say what he believes to be false or that for which he lacks evidence. On this account lying is interpreted as the violation of the maxim. Both Antas and Meibauer notice, however, that a lie needn't be told on the grounds of logical falsehood, which puts it in opposition to **speaking** the truth rather than to truth itself. The distinction between saying the falsehood and "falsely implicating" sets the discussion of lying in the context of an ongoing discussion about the semantics/pragmatics interface.

The main aim of the paper is to examine the act of lying with reference to the explicit-implicit distinction in the cognitive, relevance-theoretic, model of utterance comprehension (cf. Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995, 2004; Wilson and Sperber 2012), which rejected the maxim of truthfulness on the grounds that "expectations of truthfulness – to the extent that they exist – are a by-product of expectations of relevance" (Wilson and Sperber 2002, 584). The honesty of speakers and the reliability of their testimony are claimed to be, to a large extent, an effect of hearers' "epistemic vigilance", that is, an ability aimed at filtering out misinformation from communicated contents (Sperber et al. 2010; Sperber 2013). The paper views lying in the context of interpersonal communication, as a pragmatic act and a linguistic strategy intentionally employed by the speaker to manipulate the hearer's interpretation of an utterance both at the level of explicit and implicit content (Carston 2002, 2009, 2010, 2012; Wilson and Sperber 2012). Faced with epistemic vigilance, a successful liar must exhibit a high level of logical and cognitive efficiency. Since encoded linguistic meaning (logical form) falls short (often far short) of determining the proposition expressed by an utterance (explicature) and its implicatures, there is a potential for a liar to achieve his goal by influencing the interpretation process at different stages of pragmatic enrichment. Accordingly, an attempt is made in the paper to categorize lies by placing them along the explicit-implicit continuum, depending on the type of pragmatic task that is to lead the hearer to a false belief. The data-based analysis will, hopefully, reveal more about the nature of lying and contribute to the heated debate on the explicit/implicit distinction.

### **References:**

- Antas, J. 2000. *O klamstwie i klamaniu*. Kraków: TAIWPN Universitas.
- Barnes, J. A. 1994. *A pack of lies: Towards a sociology of lying*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carson, T. L. 2010. *Lying and deception: Theory and practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carston, R. 2002. *Thoughts and utterances. The pragmatics of explicit communication*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- . 2009. The explicit/implicit distinction in pragmatics and the limits of explicit communication. *International Review of Pragmatics* 1, no. 1: 35-62.
- . 2010. Explicit communication and "free" pragmatic enrichment. In *Explicit communication: Essays on Robyn Carston's pragmatics*, edited by B. Soria and E. Romero. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- . 2012. Implicature and explicature. In *Cognitive pragmatics*. (Vol. 4), edited by H. J. Schmid. Mouton de Gruyter.
- Grice, H. P. 1975. Logic and conversation. In *Syntax and semantics 3: Speech acts*, edited by P. Cole and J. Morgan. New York: Academic Press, 41-58. Reprinted in H. P. Grice 1989: 22-40.
- Martin, C. (ed.). 2009. *The philosophy of deception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Meibauer, J. 2005. Lying and falsely implicating. *Journal of Pragmatics* 37: 1373-1399.
- . 2011. On lying: Intentionality, implicature and imprecision. *Intercultural Pragmatics* 8, no. 2: 277-292.
- Saul, J. 2012. *Lying, misleading, and what is said*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sorensen, R. 2007. Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 88: 251-264.



- Sperber, D. 2013. Speakers are honest because hearers are vigilant: Reply to Kourken Michaelian. *Episteme* 10, no. 1: 61-71.
- Sperber, D. and D. Wilson. [1986] 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
- . 2004. Relevance theory. In *The handbook of Pragmatics*, edited by L. Horn and G. Ward. Oxford: Blackwell, 607-632.
- Sperber, D., F. Clément, Ch. Heintz, O. Mascaro, H. Mercier, G. Origgi and D. Wilson. 2010. Epistemic vigilance. *Mind and Language* 25-4: 359-393.
- Wilson, D. and D. Sperber. 2002. Truthfulness and relevance. *Mind* 111: 583-632.
- . 2012. *Meaning and relevance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

### Beate Lubberger

University of North Dakota, US  
belubberger@gmail.com

### Regina Blass

Africa International University and University of North Dakota, US  
regina\_blass@sil.org

## The procedural marker *loo* in Indus Kohistani as an indicator of desirable utterances

Wilson (Wilson and Sperber 2012, 253-257) introduces the notion of desirable utterances as part of non-attributive metarepresentations: Consider (1) taken from Noh 1998

- (1) MARY [to Peter, as door bell rings]: If that's John, I'm not here.

Here, Mary wants Peter to say, 'Mary is not here'. In her utterance, she is metarepresenting the desirable utterance 'Mary is not here'.

We propose that Indus Kohistani utterances marked by *loo* are just that: instances of metarepresentations of desirable utterances. We further claim that *loo* is a procedural indicator encouraging the construction of a higher-level explicatures (Wilson, ebd :166) of the type 'Tell B to say to C ...'

The Indus Kohistani marker *loo* is a metarepresentation marker with a seemingly twofold function: First, it marks utterances that a person A wants her addressee B to reproduce to a person C. An English example illustrates this use. Person A tells person B, "Tell person C that tonight I will be at home after five o'clock". The underlined part of person A's utterance is the part that she wants to be reproduced; and this is the part that is marked by *loo* in Indus Kohistani.

In its second function, *loo* indicates third person imperative. In such a clause marked by *loo*, the subject is a third person singular or plural; the verb has a second-person singular or second-person plural imperative suffix and is followed by *loo*. The meaning conveyed by such a construction is 'he/they should do s.th.'

Whereas in the former kind of utterance, a person B is asked to reproduce person A's utterance to person C, in the latter kind, person A's uttered command or permission does not necessarily require a person B as a conveyor. Our claim is the both cases are instances of metarepresentations of a desirable utterance.

*Loo* is an enclitic that follows the final element of a clause which usually is the verb. Consider (1):

- (1) *oó*    *phaaliá*    *khún*            *kãã*            *thu*  
 VOC                    inside            who                    be.PRS.M.SG
- şás*                    *awáaz*    *kám*                    *kar-í=loo*  
 DEM.SG.DOM            voice    less                    do-IMP.2PL=DUM
- 'Oh Ph., who is inside (the room with the TV)? (Tell them) turn down the volume'

There is no speech introducer at all and it is only *loo* that indicates that the people in the TV room should be told to turn down the volume.

Consider example (2) indicating that speaker A wishes her command to be made known to recipient C.

- (2) *gi*    *waxt*    *kháan*    *i-il-uú*            *so*    *muútyõõ*    *tãã*            *háa*  
 what    time    cough    come-PFV-COND    3SG.DIST    in.front    REFL            hand



*tsha-á=loo*      *yaá*   *bígi*   *zór*      *dhay'=loo*      *če*      *so*      *kháan*  
 place-IMP.2SG=DUM      or      some      clothes      hold.IMP.2SG=DUM      COMP      3SG.DIST.      cough

*píí*      *mut*      *máas-ãã*      *kira*      *níí*      *ríng-ee*  
 over.there      other      man-GEN.M      to      not      attach-SBJV.3SG

‘If he (the TB patient) has to cough then he should cover his mouth with his hand or with some piece of cloth so that the cough (the droplets) does not reach others.’ (TB text #3)

We propose that the third-person imperative function of the marker *loo* is just a special case of the basic function as a marker of desirable utterances.

### Ewa Mioduszewska

University of Warsaw, Poland

e.mioduszewska@uw.edu.pl

## Analogy and concept-relatedness in relevance theory

In relevance theory (RT) concepts<sup>1</sup> are “enduring elementary mental structure[s] capable of playing different discriminatory or inferential roles on different occasions in an individual’s mental life” (Sperber and Wilson 2012, 35). They may be lexicalized atomic concepts, atomic concepts not encoded in our linguistic system and some innate concepts (Carston 2010, 14). Concepts may be shared between interlocutors, idiosyncratic but grounded in common experience or fully idiosyncratic and non-communicable. They are “arrived at through mutual pragmatic adjustment of explicature and contextual implicatures” (Carston 2010, 10). Ad-hoc concepts are “pragmatically derived, generally ineffable, non-lexicalized [...] rough indication to aid readers in understanding what we have in mind in particular cases” (Carston 2010, 13). Words may encode full-fledged (atomic) concept, pro-concepts or procedural meaning (see Carston 2010, 9). Words do not have to encode the same concept for all successful users. Concepts encoded will only occasionally be the same as the ones communicated. Words are used to convey not only the concept they encode but also indefinitely many other RELATED [EM] concepts to which they may point in a given context (Sperber and Wilson 2012, 43).

The question of relatedness of concepts potentially encoded and those actually conveyed is not trivial. Apparently, RT restricts the relatedness by the search for relevance (definitions of (optimal) relevance, principles of relevance and relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure) and the potential connection between the denotations of these concepts. The mechanisms, however, seem not to be explicitly described, operational and predictable. What provides a very general but, at the same time, precise account of concept-relatedness is Hofstadter and Sander’s (2013) understanding of analogy. The question posed here is whether this understanding is compatible with RT assumptions on theoretical grounds and, if so, whether it could be used in explicating concept-relatedness in Relevance Theory, which, in turn, has a direct bearing on the interpretation of the literal/non-literal continuum.

### References:

- Barsalou, L. 1987. The instability of graded structure. Implications for the nature of concepts. In *Concepts and conceptual development. Ecological and intellectual factors in categorization*, edited by U. Neisser. Cambridge University Press, 101-140.
- Carston, R. 1997. Enrichment and loosening. Complementary processes in deriving the propositions expressed. *Linguistische Berichte* 8: 103-127.
- . 2010. Lexical pragmatics, ad-hoc concepts and metaphor: A relevance theory perspective. *Italian Journal of Linguistics* 22, no. 1: 157-180.
- Fodor, J. 1975. *The language of thought*. New York: Crowell.
- . 1983. *The modularity of mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

---

<sup>1</sup> The interpretation of concepts in RT is well grounded in the overall discussion of their nature (see Barsalou 1987; Carston 1997; Fodor 1975, 1983; Gibbs 1994; Recanati 1995, 2004 and more) with there still being more questions than answers: are concepts atomic, decompositional or definitional? How stable are they as components of our thinking apparatus? What is the nature of the shift from (atomic) lexical concepts to (atomic) ad-hoc concepts? What is the nature of the ad-hoc concepts in the mind?



- Gibbs, R. 1994. *The poetics of mind: Figurative thought, language and understanding*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hofstadter, D. and E. Sander. 2013. *Surfaces and essences. Analogy as the fuel and fire of thinking*. New York: Basic Books.
- Recanati, F. 1995. The alleged priority of literal interpretation. *Cognitive Science* 19: 207-232.
- . 2004. *Literal meaning*. Cambridge University Press
- Sperber, D. and D. Wilson. 2012. The mapping between the mental and the public lexicon. In *Meaning and relevance*. Cambridge University Press, 31-47. Originally published in *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* 9: 1-20, 1997/1998.

## **Chisako Nakamura**

Kobe University, Japan  
chisakoiga@yahoo.co.jp

### **The linguistic tricks of Agatha Christie**

In this paper a style analysis of the detective short stories by Agatha Christie is made from a viewpoint of Relevance Theory. This investigates the linguistic tricks of Agatha Christie not to let the readers allow to solve the given crime story like the detective, Miss Marple.

Main four techniques are found: to restrict the thinking way of the readers by presumption of optimal relevance, to strengthen the procedure of saturation or free enrichment the readers follow, to weaken the procedure of saturation or free enrichment the readers follow, and to give indirectly the key information to create new contexts.

Here the examples are shown using *The Tuesday Night Club* (1932/1997). In this story one of solution keys is the interpretation of the words “hundreds and thousands” in the expression “when she is dead I will ... hundreds and thousands ...” left in a blotting pad by a suspect. A hotel maid guessed it as a part of an expression “when she is dead I will inherit hundreds and thousands of pounds”. The suspect explained that it was written in answer to his brother who had applied to him for money pointing out when his wife was dead he would have control of money and would assist his brother if possible. He regretted his inability to help but pointed out that there were hundreds and thousands of people in the world in the same unfortunate plight. Those key words are properly processed in each context as the meaning of large number. So by presumption of optimal relevance the readers stop interpreting the words “hundreds and thousands”.

The storyteller who knows the solution of the crime states “..., it seemed clear that it could not have been done in any way of the things eaten at supper, as all three persons had partaken of the meal.” The readers interpret the sentence adding the detail meaning through the procedure of free enrichment as “all three persons had eaten up all the same dishes” though they aren’t aware of the possibility to contain the meaning “at that time it seemed clear...” Therefore, they won’t pay their attention to the dishes any more.

However, Miss Marple points out two of the three persons didn’t eat tiny sugar beads on the trifle which is one of the dishes from the words “banting” given later and “hundreds and thousands”. Banting is not to eat sugar or carbohydrates in order to lose weight, and “hundreds and thousands” has another meaning of “tiny sugar beads”. Without bringing out the knowledge from those given words the readers can’t solve the crime like Miss Marple.

Thus in this paper the linguistic techniques of Agatha Christie are discussed.

#### **References:**

- Christie, A. 1932/1997. *The Tuesday Night Club*, London: HarperCollins.
- Sperber D. and D. Wilson. [1986] 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. London: Blackwell.



**Paulina Nalewajko**

University of Social Sciences and Humanities (SWPS), Warsaw, Poland  
pnalewajko1@swps.edu.pl

### **Seducing (with) the senses. Metaphorical representation of sensuality as the stylistic dominant in the short stories by Gabriel García Márquez**

Gabriel García Márquez was one of the most popular and admired writers of his time. He was adored by devoted readers and respected by critics worldwide. However, the main focus of the latter were always the same topics: Gabriel García Márquez as the main representative of magical realism, the myth in his work, the writer and his political views, etc. Meanwhile, if we analyse the total of his work, we'll see that each of these topics appears only in some of its parts, and the stylistic dominant of the Colombian author, so efficient in seducing his readers, seems to be different. In my opinion the dominant is the metaphorical representation of sensuality (understood as the sensorial perception).

Therefore, I have analysed 40 short stories by García Márquez from various periods of his work (including 1947-1992). Each story was studied using the methodology developed for this purpose (based on *MIP: A Method for Identifying Metaphorically Used Words in Discourse*). The main theoretical model used in the analysis was the Conceptual Blending Theory developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (framed in 2002 in *The Way We Think*).

The conclusion from the analysis is that the representation of the sensuality is the principal and constant feature of the Colombian writer's style. Based on the analysis, it is clear that over nearly fifty years of work, this style has evolved considerably, but some strategies of representing sensuality remain unchanged from the first story. The success of this strategy seems to be based on the writer's extraordinary sensitivity to the diversity and multi-level meanings of the language used and the complexity of sensory experience. Therefore, I find sensuality one of the main ways of seducing the reader used by the Colombian Nobel Prize winner.

In my speech I would like to present some of the results of my study on the selected examples of the original short stories in Spanish and also show what type of modification occurs in this phenomenon of metaphorical representation of sensuality in the translation of the short stories into Polish and English.

#### **References:**

- Fauconnier, Gilles and Mark Turner. 2002. *The way we think. Conceptual blending and the mind's hidden complexities*. New York: Basic Books.
- Pragglejaz Group. 2007. MIP: A method for identifying metaphorically used words in discourse. *Metaphor and Symbol* 22, no. 1: 1-39.

**Anabella-Gloria Niculescu-Gorpin**

Romanian Academy and University of Bucharest, Romania  
anabellaniculescu@hotmail.com

### **A relevance-theoretic approach to stylistic choices in mother and child related discourse**

My presentation is focused on the stylistic choices made in several types of mother and child related discourse, such as advertisements or informative texts. More specifically, I have looked at the way in which metaphors, hyperboles or puns authors choose to employ when addressing beginning and experienced mothers in relation to their newborns transfigure and modify the discourse, wondering whether such stylistic choices are indeed relevant for the audience, i.e. they bring additional cognitive effects, or only hinder the processing of such messages. As this is on-going research, my tentative conclusion is that there is no definite YES/NO answer, but a continuum of cases as my analysis will show.

#### **References:**

- Barsalou, Lawrence. W. 1983. Ad hoc categories. *Memory and Cognition* 11: 211-27.
- Qiu, Jin. 2013. A cognitive-pragmatic approach to puns. *International Journal of Applied Linguistics & English Literature* 2, no. 4: 135-141

- Solska, Agnieszka. 2012. The relevance-based model of context in processing puns. *Research in Language* 10, no. 4: 387-404.
- Wilson, Deirdre. 2003. Relevance theory and lexical pragmatics. *Italian Journal of Linguistics/Rivista di Linguistica* 15, no. 2: 273-291. *Special Issue on Pragmatics and the Lexicon*. Reprinted in 2004 *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* 16.
- Wilson, Deirdre and Robyn Carston. 2006. Metaphor, relevance and the ‘emergent property’ issue. *Mind & Language* 21: 404-433.
- . 2007. A unitary approach to lexical pragmatics: Relevance, inference and ad hoc concepts. In *Pragmatics*, edited by N. Burton-Roberts. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 230-259.
- Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber. 2004. Relevance theory. In *The handbook of pragmatics*, edited by L. Horn and G. Ward. Oxford: Blackwell, here from [www.dan.sperber.com](http://www.dan.sperber.com).
- Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. 2008. A deflationary account of metaphors. In *The Cambridge handbook of metaphor and thought*, edited by R. W. Gibbs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 84-105.

### Clene Nyiramahoro

Africa International University, Nairobi  
and SIL International  
[cnyiramahoro@yahoo.com](mailto:cnyiramahoro@yahoo.com)

## Understanding cultural ethos of conflict through Kinyarwanda proverbs

The purpose of this paper is to suggest a new path of thoughts in the search for solutions to lasting healing and peace in a society that has been characterized by, what scholars, such as Bar-Tal (1998a) and others, have called, “intractable conflict”.

In the attempt to understand the conceptualization of conflict in the Rwandan culture, I will analyze the concept of “*inzigo*” that describes some mental states and attitude towards an individual or a group of people who are considered “permanent enemy or permanent adversary”, usually after a murder has occurred. “*Uguhoora inzigo*” or the act of “vengeance” is a cultural practice that was carried out by the victim’s lineage on any male, including children, from the murderer’s lineage. It was always required in cases of any killing even if it was involuntary. Members of those lineages had to be always vigilant to avoid any surprise, for any act of vengeance came as a surprise. In cases where the act of vengeance became impossible, other strategies were adopted including disguised friendship, a strategy to “defeat the enemy’s vigilance” (Sperber et al. 2010).

I will show that the concept and other related concepts such as “*inziika*” (a derived noun from the verb “*ziika*” or to burry), have encyclopaedic entries and are encoded concepts, which, in some particular contexts—family, ethnic group, government—get some specific meaning, that of ad hoc concepts. The term “*inziika*” refers to hatred that is deep-rooted in the minds of people, and becomes like sickness that only can heal after an act of vengeance or “*guhoora inzigo*” is carried out.

I will look at oral traditions, especially proverbs, that denote conflicts, which, when uttered in the context of conflicts activate the “mental schema” or encyclopaedic assumptions of conflict. Proverbs meta-represent the nation’s wisdom, its cultural values and beliefs. I claim that, as it is the case in a number of other African societies, proverbs are genuine representation of how Rwandan people view themselves, and a preferred mode of expressing their thoughts and feelings. I agree with Gándara who puts it in these words that,

Proverbs activate culturally established and accepted mental schemata, providing two types of information for interpretation: conceptual information and procedural information. On recognizing a proverb as such, the relevant mental schema is immediately activated. On a cognitive level there is *spreading activation*: elaborate associations can be built up, hypotheses can be generated, and so on, independently of the explicit textual surface (Gándara, p. 348)

Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), social psychologists (Bar-Tal 1998a, 2009) and Gándara’s (2004) accounts will form the basis of my analysis.

### References:

- Bar-Tal, Daniel. 2000. From intractable conflict through conflict resolution to reconciliation: Psychological analysis. *Political Psychology* 27: 351-365.
- Gándara, Lelia. 2004. ‘They that sow the wind...’: Proverbs and sayings in argumentation. *Discourse and Society* 15, nos. 2-3: 345-359.
- Sperber, Dan. 1996. *Explaining culture: A naturalistic approach*. Oxford: Blackwell.



Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. 1995. *Relevance: communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Blackwell.

### **Manuel Padilla Cruz**

University of Seville, Spain  
mpadillacruz@us.es

## **Participial adjectives and epistemic vigilance**

Linguistic communication is a complex activity wherein humans fulfill a wide array of social and cognitive goals, among which is dispensing information that may contribute to others' worldview and universe of beliefs. In many cases, communicators have sound evidence about the information they transmit and they do their best to appear as trustworthy individuals and to present that information as credible or deserving credibility. In other cases, however, communicators may not be completely certain or lack adequate evidence about the information they dispense, so they are interested in indicating this to their audience. One of the many ways to do this available to communicators is through stylistic choices.

Information linguistically communicated is processed by the audience through a relevance-driven process of mutual parallel adjustment that yields optimally relevant interpretations (Sperber and Wilson 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004). However, optimally relevant interpretations need not always be reliable or credible, as communicators might be deceptive. The audience will only believe a particular interpretation, and will add the information communicated to their universe of beliefs, if that information passes the filters of the mechanisms of *epistemic vigilance* (Mascaro and Sperber 2009; Sperber et al. 2010). These mechanisms check the credibility and reliability of both communicators and the information they provide. Among other factors, these mechanisms pay attention to signs of the communicator's reliability, reputational cues, emotional reactions, inferences about what the communicator says and her style, etc. (Origi 2013).

This presentation focuses on a group of the so-called *participial adjectives* that modify heads of noun phrases in *attributive* position (Greenbaum and Quirk 1993; Huddleston 1993). As opposed to prototypical adjectives providing information about the properties or states of the head nouns they co-occur with, the participial adjectives under analysis can be regarded as markers indicating the communicator's epistemic stance towards the information communicated. Thus, these participles function like evidentials (Ifantidou 2001): with them the communicator assists the audience's processing by signaling whether the information communicated can be believed or not (Wilson 2012).

### **References:**

- Greenbaum, Sidney and Randolph Quirk. 1993. *A student's grammar of the English language*. London: Longman.
- Huddleston, Rodney. 1993. *Introduction to the grammar of English*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ifantidou, Elly. 2001. *Evidentials and relevance*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Mascaro, Olivier and Dan Sperber. 2009. The moral, epistemic, and mindreading components of children's vigilance towards deception. *Cognition* 112, no. 3: 367-380.
- Origi, Gloria. 2013. Epistemic injustice and epistemic trust. *Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy* 26, no. 2: 221-235.
- Sperber, Dan et al. 2010. Epistemic vigilance. *Mind and Language* 25, no. 4: 359-393.
- Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wilson, Deirdre. 2012. Modality and the conceptual-procedural distinction. In *Relevance theory: More than understanding*, edited by E Wałaszewska and A. Piskorska. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber. 2002. Relevance theory. *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* 14: 249-287.
- . 2004. Relevance theory. In *The handbook of pragmatics*, edited by L. Horn and G. Ward. Oxford: Blackwell.



**Agnieszka Piskorska**

University of Warsaw, Poland  
a.piskorska@uw.edu.pl

### **What ironic utterances do not communicate to irony-blind individuals**

Irony is in many ways unique. As discussed by Wilson and Sperber (2012), it is characterised by three features which are not displayed by other tropes: specific attitude, normative bias, and tone of voice. Irony is also unique in the sense that grasping the speaker-intended ironic interpretation requires a successful simultaneous operation of a specific set of pragmatic processes: the hearer has to identify the utterance as interpretive, identify the content of the assumption echoed, attribute it to some source, work out implicatures and identify a social function behind the speaker's ironic utterance (the latter may not be strictly speaking a comprehension task but is nevertheless related to identifying the speaker's attitude, which is part of comprehension process). The ability to perform and synchronise these tasks depends not only on the functioning of mental mechanisms, such as metarepresentative abilities, but also on the availability of contextual resources in which ironic interpretations can arise (Yus 2000), as predicted by the relevance-guided comprehension heuristic (Sperber, Cara and Girotto 1995). A similar standpoint is being increasingly recognised in experimental studies linking performance in irony comprehension to social interest rather than to cognitive abilities alone (see Chevallier 2011 for discussion). This paper explores the possibility of bringing the two perspectives, i.e. the RT view and the social interest view on irony together.

#### **References:**

- Chevallier, C. 2011. Theory of mind and autism: Beyond Baron-Cohen et al.'s Sally-Anne study. In *Refreshing developmental psychology: Beyond the classic studies*, edited by A. Slater and P. Quinn. Sage.
- Sperber, D., F. Cara and V. Girotto. 1995. Relevance theory explains the selection task. *Cognition* 57: 31-95.
- Wilson, D. and D. Sperber. 2012. Explaining irony. In *Meaning and relevance*. Cambridge: CUP, 123-145.
- Yus, F. 2000. On reaching the intended ironic interpretation. *International Journal of Communication* 10, nos. 1-2: 27-78.

**Maria Angeles Ruiz-Moneva**

University of Zaragoza, Spain  
mruiz@unizar.es

### **Intercultural misunderstandings as a source of humour and irony in George Mikes' *How to be a Brit*: A relevance-theoretic approach**

In his well-known trilogy, *How to be an Alien*, *How to be Inimitable* and *How to be Decadent* George Mikes depicts what are reflected as the 'strange' habits of the British as seen by an outsider. He himself refers to his purpose in writing *How to be an Alien* as "a *cri de coeur*, a desperate cry for help: oh God, look at me, I have fallen among strange people!". The works offer, therefore, highly satiric, humorous and ironic views of the experiences lived by the author as a foreigner among the British.

These works also become a fruitful field to explore intercultural relationships and intercultural misunderstandings. The author's perspective as an outsider allows him to reflect and draw on what he regards as his misadjustment to the world knowledge and to the cosmovision of the British.

Relevance theory (most importantly, Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2004; Clark 2013) offers a coherent account of human communication as an ostensive-inferential process, where the addressee seeks to inferentially recognise the speaker's communicative intention. Misunderstandings may arise as a result of the addressee's wrong identification of the speaker's communicative intention; or also as a mismatch of the cognitive environments of the two, which consequently fails to become 'mutual' or 'mutually manifest'. But at the same time, cultural factors play an essential role in the broadening of the cognitive environment shared by communicator and addressee.

Humour and irony have extensively been covered within the relevance-theoretical framework (the former, in works by authors such as Curcó 1997; Yus 2003; the latter ranges from the time even before the theory was explicitly fleshed out, by Sperber and Wilson 1978, 1981, and extends up to the very recent present: Yus 2012; Wilson 2013). The present paper sets out to explore those aspects of irony and humour which in the works by Mikes are interculturally grounded, and will seek a relevance-theoretical explanation for them. The roles played

by both irony and humour in the creation of style will be explored. Following the relevance-theoretical framework, it will be assumed that style and stylistic effects guide the addressee's search for optimal relevance.

**Keywords:** relevance theory, intercultural misunderstandings, humour, irony

### References:

- Clark, B. 2013. *Relevance theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Curcó, C. 1997. *The pragmatics of humorous interpretations: A relevance-theoretic account*. Unpublished PhD. Dissertation. University College London.
- Mikes, G. *How to be a Brit. A George Mikes minibus*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Sperber, D. and D. Wilson. 1978. Les ironies comme mentions. *Poétique* 36: 399-412.
- . 1981. Irony and the use-mention distinction. In *Radical pragmatics*, edited by P. Cole. New York: Academic Press, 295-318.
- . [1986] 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wilson, D. 2013. Irony comprehension: A developmental perspective. *Journal of Pragmatics* 59: 40-56.
- Wilson D. and D. Sperber. 2004. Relevance theory. In *The handbook of pragmatics*, edited by L. R. Horn and G. Ward. Oxford: Blackwell, 607-632.
- Yus, F. 2003. Humor and the search for relevance. *Journal of Pragmatics* 35, no. 9: 1295-1331. Special issue on the pragmatics of humour.
- . 2012. Relevance theory and contextual sources-centred analysis of irony. Current research and compatibility. Paper delivered at *EPICS V*. Pablo de Olavide UIniversity (Seville, Spain), March.

### Ryoko Sasamoto

Dublin City University, Ireland  
ryoko.sasamoto@dcu.ie

### Minako O'Hagan

Dublin City University, Ireland

## Relevance, style and multimodality: Typographical features as stylistic devices

'Crazy' subtitles, or the textual inserts which often occupy a sizable part of the TV screen, have become a key feature in Japanese TV (see Figure 1):



Figure 1. A typical Japanese programme

These captions are not conventional 'subtitles'. Brightly coloured, in various fonts and effects, they are not for the hard-of-hearing. They are not even faithful representations of the diegetic sound or description. Instead, these captions give rise to enhanced stylistic effects. This raises the questions of what these effects are, and how they arise.

Problems with such overall effects are nothing new. In the traditional, descriptive literature, intuitions about the relationship between style and linguistic form were often accounted for by distinctions such as given-new and theme-rheme. However, in relevance theory, stylistic effects emerge from a natural linkage between linguistic form and pragmatic effects. Sperber and Wilson (1995) explain these stylistic effects are the result of the speaker exploiting structural features of utterances to convey the intended interpretation at a minimum

(justifiable) cost. In other words, they do not emerge as a result of linguistic rule, and as such, no special mechanisms are needed for their interpretation. Wilson and Wharton (2006) demonstrate that so-called stylistic devices such as stress patterns can be used as natural highlighting devices to draw attention to particular utterance constituents, guiding the hearer to an optimally relevant interpretation in those contexts.

While relevance-theoretic stylistics enables us to account for how “particular linguistic formulations give rise to particular kinds of effects” (Clark 2013), the linkage between non-verbal features and stylistic effects is under-researched, except, perhaps, for Wharton’s (2009) work on non-verbal communication. However, with increased interest in multimodality, it is imperative that we take into consideration the fact that communication more often than not comes in more than one mode. It is thus important to examine how ostensibly used multimodal stimuli such as Japanese captions interact with other programme elements, and influence the viewer interpretation process.

This paper unpacks the contribution of the decoding of multimodal stimuli to inference, and the consequences this has for the interpretation process, with a special focus on typographical features added onto textual inserts used in Japanese broadcasts. Using data derived from a mixed-methods approach (using eye-tracking), we evaluate the relationship between cognitive processing and communicative stimuli and a multimodal content analysis. We demonstrate how typographical features (colours and fonts) are highlighting devices which are used as stylistic devices by TV producers to manipulate the viewer interpretation process by guiding the audience to an intended interpretation. The results suggest how editorial choices regarding typographical features to trigger certain effects might be subsumed under the current view of style in relevance theory.

## References:

- Clark, Billy. 2013. *Relevance theory*. Cambridge: CUP.  
 Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford, Blackwell.  
 Wharton, Tim. 2009. *Pragmatics and non-verbal communication*. Cambridge: CUP  
 Wilson, Deirdre, and Tim Wharton. 2006. Relevance and prosody. *Journal of Pragmatics* 38: 1559-79.

## Daniel Sax

University of Social Sciences and Humanities (SWPS), Warsaw, Poland  
 sax.dan@gmail.com

### **Vagueness of thoughts, speaker’s approximation, or translator’s approximation? On the pitfalls of translating the Polish indefinite numerals *kilkanaście* and *kilkadziesiąt* into English**

The Polish indefinite numerals *kilkanaście* (lit. ‘several-teen’) and *kilkadziesiąt* (lit. ‘several-ty’) have no literal equivalent in English, and as such pose numerous serious obstacles in translation. This presentation will explore some of the theoretical issues that underlie this difficulty, from a relevance-theoretic perspective.

Note that a speaker referring to an indefinite quantity: a) may have a definite concept of quantity in mind (e.g. *four books*), yet opt to communicate a vaguer approximation thereof (e.g. *several books*) in order to keep the hearer’s processing effort down, or b) may wish to communicate a thought that is itself vague, involving only an indefinite quantity. The first possibility is more commonly assumed in the literature on the semantics of numeral systems (e.g. Xu & Regier 2014), although the latter possibility is also recognized for instance by Krifka (2009).

Note also that indefinite quantifiers (e.g. *several*), being inherently approximate, are interpreted differently from other approximations constructed phrasally, which are built around some definite quantity as a reference point (e.g. *about four*, *more than three*, or *less than five*) and thereby raise the salience of that definite quantity.

Both these issues come into play when translating *kilkanaście* and *kilkadziesiąt* into English. As we will illustrate with examples, the choice of potential target-language expression is affected by:

- (1) the translator’s assumptions about the source of the vagueness in the source language,
- (2) the translator’s options for greater or lesser precision in the target language,
- (3) target-language stylistic issues (permissible collocations),
- (4) the genre of text (e.g. scientific texts demand more stringent numerical precision)
- (5) the translator’s degree of access to text-external information.

We conclude by proposing that the conceptual content encoded by *kilkanaście* and *kilkadziesiąt* is not ‘a quantity between 11 and 19’ and ‘a quantity between 20 and 90’, respectively (as proposed for instance by Zagórska (1976, 326), but rather ‘a quantity denoted by a Polish word ending in *-naście*’ and ‘a quantity denoted by a Polish word ending in *-dziesiąt*’. The invocation of the morphological form of the words would account for the highly language-specific nature of the concepts so encoded, thereby in part explaining the problematic aspects of their translation.

### References:

- Krifka, Manfred. 2009. Approximate interpretations of number words: A case for strategic communication. In *Theory and evidence in semantics*, edited by E. Hinrichs and J. Nerbonne. Stanford: CSLI, 109-132.
- Xu, Yang and Terry Regier. 2014. Numeral systems across languages support efficient communication: From approximate numerosity to recursion. In *Proceedings of the 36th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society*, edited by P. Bello et al.
- Zagórska Brooks, Maria. 1976. *Polish reference grammar*. De Gruyter.

### Kate Scott

Kingston University, London, UK  
kate.scott@kingston.ac.uk

## Communicating with a personal style on the world wide web: #context

The more contextual assumptions that we share with our interlocutor(s) the more we are able to leave implicit, trusting that our hearer will infer our overall intended message. Indeed, the more information that is left implicit, the ‘greater the degree of mutual understanding’ that the speaker assumes (Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995, 218). With this in mind, social networking sites such as Twitter offer an interesting discourse context for investigation, as they combine an utterance length limit with an unknown or indefinitely broad audience. Twitter facilitates (and thrives on) one-to-many asynchronous communication, where a tweeter is unlikely to be able to assume that they share all, or even any, contextual assumptions with their intended audience. How then do tweeters maintain a personal, conversational style in their tweets while avoiding misunderstandings and miscommunication?

In this paper I attempt to address this question by arguing that hashtags have evolved beyond their search functionality to act as relevance optimisers, allowing tweeters to make intended contextual assumptions highly accessible to a wide range of readers in an efficient manner. Using the relevance theoretic framework (Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2012), I argue that by including content in a hashtag, a tweeter is signalling that that content should be taken, not as part of the message proper, but as a guide to how the tweet should be interpreted. In short, hashtags function procedurally, in the sense of Blakemore (1987; 2002), to fill in contextual gaps, while allowing the tweeter to maintain an informal, conversational style.

The procedural meaning contained within the hashtag may contribute to what is explicitly communicated by the utterance by, for example, guiding reference resolution as in (1):

- (1) She’s done it! An amazing amazing effort. [#davina](#) [#windermere](#)

It may also contribute to the communication of higher level explicatures conveying attitude or speech act information as in (2):

- (2) Did you know that kingston uni will be refurbishing the clattern lecture theatre soon? [#finally](#) [#muchneeded](#)

Finally, we find examples where the hashtag contributes to the construction of the intended context, and thereby plays a role in implicature derivation, as in (3) and (4):

- (3) Sending positive vibes. Positive vibes. Positive vibes. [#mcfc](#)  
(4) I feel like I am falling over on the inside. [#winehangover](#)

In each case the information in the hashtag activates certain contextual assumptions and thus guides the reader’s inferential processes. This bridges the gap between the tweeter’s cognitive environment and the cognitive environments of a disparate range of readers, while allowing a conversational, personal style to be maintained.



## References:

- Blakemore, D. 1987. *Semantic constraints on relevance*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- . 2002. *Relevance and linguistic meaning: The semantics and pragmatics of discourse markers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sperber, D. and D. Wilson. [1986] 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. Second edition (with postface). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wilson, D. and D. Sperber. 2012. *Meaning and relevance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## Agnieszka Solska

University of Silesia, Poland  
agnpaul@hotmail.com, agnieszka.solska@us.edu.pl

### Tropes of ill repute: puns and (thwarted) expectations of relevance

In discussions of metaphorical language the title of Ortony's 1975 paper "Why metaphors are necessary and not just nice" is sometimes evoked, indicating the views on metaphor which, after decades (if not centuries) of extensive research, now prevail in the scholarly world. If the commonly held attitudes towards puns were to be expressed in a similar dictum, its more charitable version might be "Why puns are not necessary, though they can be nice", but its more likely variant would probably be "Why puns are neither necessary nor nice". Though puns are widely employed in works of literature and in diverse everyday situations, though they have their apologists, though they are an object of study within the realms of literary stylistics, theory of literature, as well as linguistics, the fact remains that to many language users, especially speakers of English, they are somewhat suspect. These figures of style, exploiting an ambiguity between identically or similar-sounding words for a humorous or rhetorical effect, are often perceived as inappropriate, as something to be ashamed of. This is reflected in set expressions used in English to acknowledge that a pun has been made. While no speaker ever apologizes for speaking metaphorically or for resorting to irony, phrases such as *Pardon the pun* or (sometimes insincere) assurances *No pun intended* or are routinely uttered when a pun has been produced.

The aim of this paper is to explore this widespread perception of punning as a verbal art of low standing in the light of the relevance-theoretic model of utterance interpretation. It will begin by identifying key features of puns, which set them off from other stylistic devices, and by specifying the three necessary and sufficient conditions an utterance has to meet to be perceived as a pun. Next it will examine the range of meanings conveyed by punning utterances and will outline the interpretive route taken by the addressee in working these meanings out. A number of puns found in different communicative settings will then be discussed to demonstrate that the kind of contextual effects offered by different instances of punning utterances are not uniform and may often be disappointing to some hearers. It will be argued that the problematic status of puns in the minds of many language users is to a large extent the consequence of the fact that like no other stylistic device puns often thwart the audience's expectations of optimal relevance.

## References:

- Clark, B. 1996. Stylistic analysis and relevance theory. *Language and Literature* 5: 163-178.
- Furlong, A. 2011. The soul of wit: A relevance theoretic discussion. *Language and Literature* 20: 136-150.
- Pilkington, A. 2000. *Poetic effects. A relevance theory perspective*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Solska, A. 2012a. Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure and processing multiple meanings in paradigmatic puns. In *Relevance theory. More than understanding*, edited by E. Wałaszewska and A. Piskorska. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 167-182.
- . 2012b. The relevance-based model of context in processing puns. *Research in Language* 10, no. 4: 387-404.
- Ortony, A. 1975. Why metaphors are necessary and not just nice. *Educational Theory* 25: 45-53.
- Wilson, D. and D. Sperber. 2004. Relevance theory. In *The handbook of pragmatics*, edited by G. Ward and L. Horn. Oxford: Blackwell, 607-632.
- Sperber, D. and D. Wilson. 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Blackwell.



**Cláudia Strey**  
PUCRS, Brazil  
claudiastrey@gmail.com

## **Prosody and modal verb reading: the case of Brazilian Portuguese**

In general, prosody is defined as a communicative resource which creates impressions, conveys information about emotions and alters the salience of linguistically possible interpretations (House, 1990; Clark and Lindsey, 1990). In Relevance Theory, some aspects of prosody are understood to encode procedural meaning in order to motivate the recovery of higher-level explicatures (Clark 2013; House 2006; Wilson and Wharton 2006; Wharton 2012). This paper aims to discuss prosody as a resource used in Brazilian Portuguese (BrP) to strengthen or weaken readings of modal verbs. On a lexical level, BrP has only the modal verbs *dever*, *poder* and *ter de* as in *Voce deve/tem que ir ao médico* (“You must go to the doctor”) and *Voce pode ir ao médico* (“You should go to the doctor”). However, in order to express different readings, it seems that Brazilian speakers use prosody in order to guide the hearer to a particular, slightly different interpretation of the modal in question. For example, the sentence *Voce deveria ir ao médico*, when uttered with a marked prosody, could be understood not as the weaker advice the syntactic-semantic reading would predict when uttered with a typical declarative prosody but as a strong one. This suggests that, in BrP, modality is expressed via prosody – a resource to make a modality input salient enough to attract attention and to be picked up by the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure. If this prosodic function is assumed, it suggests further research into the role of prosody in BrP is necessary. The question of to what extent prosody is a language-specific or universal also requires addressing.

### **References:**

- Clark, B. and G. Lindsey. 1990. Intonation, grammar and utterance interpretation. *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* 2: 32-51.
- Clark, B. 2013. *Relevance theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- House, J. 1990. Intonation structures and pragmatic interpretation. In *Studies in the pronunciation of English*, edited by S. Ramsaran. London: Routledge, 38-57.
- . 2006. Constructing a context with intonation. *Journal of Pragmatics* 38, no. 10: 1542-1548.
- Wharton, T. 2012. Pragmatics, prosody and non-verbal communication. In *The Cambridge handbook of pragmatics*, edited by K. Allen and K. Jaszczołt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 567-584.
- Wilson, D. and T. Wharton. 2006. Relevance and prosody. *Journal of Pragmatics* 38, no. 10: 1559-1579.

**Izabela Szymańska**  
University of Warsaw, Poland  
i.szymanska@uw.edu.pl

## **The treatment of geographical dialect in literary translation in the perspective of relevance theory**

The treatment of geographical dialects in literary translation is one of the thorniest problems of translation theory, explored as a vivid example of issues of linguistic usage and cultural associations inextricably intertwined (e.g. Wojtasiewicz 1957; Catford 1965; Berezowski 1997; Hejwowski 2010). Attested strategies of dealing with dialectal features in literary translation range from complete neutralization through various degrees of compensatory stylization (e.g. archaic, rural or colloquial) to attempts at substituting a target language geographical dialect for a source language geographical dialect, this last solution being usually questioned on the grounds of introducing cultural connotations drastically different from those evoked by the original. Analyses of translators’ chosen methods of rendering the usage of dialect invariably point to the communicative functions that a given language variety is intended to perform in the source text, thus indicating that dialect usage is a vital communicative clue for the reader and translator of a literary text. Therefore, this paper will attempt to reinterpret the strategies of dialect translation in terms of the translator’s judgement of the importance of communicative clues and the target reader’s cognitive environment, as well as of the balance of processing effort and communicative gain, along the lines of Gutt (2000). It will also examine the applicability of Gutt’s (2005) interpretation of translation as a higher-order act of communication (an act of communication that is about another, lower-order, act of communication) to the issue of dialect translation and the communicative



impact of translated texts whose originals involve dialect. Finally, it will reconsider diachronic changes in the norms of dialect rendering in a relevance-theoretic perspective, linking them with the notion of cognitive environment. Examples will be drawn from several Polish translations of Frances Hodgson Burnett's *The Secret Garden*, a novel in which dialect plays a vital communicative role, starting from the classical one from 1914 but focusing especially on the newest one published in 2012.

#### Sources:

- Berezowski, Leszek. 1997. *Dialect in translation*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
- Burnett, Frances Hodgson. 1995. *Tajemniczy ogród*. Trans. by Anna Staniewska. Warszawa: Siedmioróg.
- . 1997. *Tajemniczy ogród*. Trans. by Zbigniew Batko. Warszawa: Kama.
- . [1914] 2000. *Tajemniczy ogród*. Trans. by Jadwiga Włodarkiewicz. Warszawa: Pruszyński i s-ka.
- . 2012. *Tajemniczy ogród*. Trans. by Paweł Beręsewicz. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Skrzat.
- Catford, John C. 1965. *A linguistic theory of translation*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Federici, Federico M. ed. 2011. *Translating dialects and languages of minorities: challenges and solutions*. Oxford: Peter Lang.
- Gutt, Ernst-August. 2000. *Translation and relevance. Cognition and context*. Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing.
- . 2005. On the significance of the cognitive core of translation. *The Translator* 11: 25-49.
- Hejwowski, Krzysztof. 2010. O tłumaczeniu aluzji językowych. In *Przekład – język – kultura. Tom II*, edited by Roman Lewicki. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 41-56.
- Wojtasiewicz, Olgierd. [1957] 1992. *Wstęp do teorii tłumaczenia*. Warszawa: TEPIS.

#### Seiji Uchida

Nara University, Japan  
s-uchida@gaia.eonet.ne.jp

### Another look at “Cat in the Rain”: Strong/Weak implicature and tortoise-shell cats

Relevance theory is a promising theory of cognitive pragmatics and it covers a wide range of communication, including non-linguistic communication. Literary texts are also within the scope of the theory.

‘Cat in the Rain,’ one of Hemingway’s best short stories, has been discussed from various viewpoints, both by literary critics and by linguists. Among the points in dispute is the issue of whether the cat the American wife saw under the table in the rain was identical with the big tortoise-shell cat which was introduced in the final paragraph of the story.

The arguments can be classified into the following three groups:

- (1) The two cats are different. – Hagopian 1962, Stubbs 1983, Bennett 1990, Carter 2008
- (2) The two cats are identical. – Baker 1952
- (3) It cannot be concluded that the two cats are identical or not. – Lodge 1981, Holmesland 1990

The majority favor the first interpretation, mainly noting that the noun ‘kitty,’ which is repeatedly used throughout the story, cannot be referred to as a ‘big’ tortoise-shell cat. Baker (1952) clearly says that the first cat is the same as the tortoise-shell cat, although he doesn’t cite the reason. Lodge (1981) claims that ‘kitty’ is used from the perspective of the American wife but the animal appears as ‘a big tortoise-shell cat’ from her husband’s perspective, so it is not possible to judge the identity of the two cats.

The present paper reconsiders the issue in terms of strong/weak implicatures in relevance theory and proposes another interpretation. I argue that the interpretation that the cat the hotel owner told the maid to bring to the American wife is different from the one the wife saw is obtained as a strong implicature and that the identity of the two cats can be derived from a weak implicature. I also argue that the latter interpretation leads to an interesting implication: both cats can be the same type of cat, a tortoise-shell cat.

This fourth interpretation may invite further ‘literary’ implications such as: the hotel owner’s consideration for the American wife can be seen there, but it also shows a limitation since he was not able to provide the same cat as the wife saw in the rain.

#### References:

- Baker, C. 1952. *Hemingway: The writer as artist*. Princeton University Press.



- Bennett, W. 1990. The Poor Kitty and the Padrone and the Tortoise-shell Cat in "Cat in the Rain". In *New critical approaches to the short stories of Ernest Hemingway*, edited by J. J. Benson. Duke University Press, 245-256.
- Carter, R. 2008. Style and interpretation in Hemingway's "Cat in the Rain". In *The language and literature reader*, edited by R. Carter and P. Stockwell. Routledge, 96-108.
- Hagopian, J. V. 1962. Symmetry in "Cat in the Rain". *College English* 24: 220-222.
- Holmesland, O. 1990. Structuralism and interpretation: Ernest Hemingway's "Cat in the Rain". In *New critical approaches to the short stories of Ernest Hemingway*, edited by J. J. Benson. Duke University Press, 58-72.
- Lodge, D. 1980. Analysis and interpretation of the realist text: A pluralistic approach to Ernest Hemingway's "Cat in the Rain". *Poetics Today* 1, no. 4: 5-22.
- Stubbs, M. 1983. *Discourse analysis: The sociolinguistic analysis of natural language*. Basil Blackwell.

## Monica Vasileanu

The University of Bucharest, Romania  
monica.vasileanu@gmail.com

### What was a *relevant translation* in the 18<sup>th</sup> century?

The present presentation is part of a larger project that aims at finding a *relevant* explanation to some questions arising from an 18<sup>th</sup> century Latin-to-English translation.

The source-texts are the Latin and the English version of a historical work written by a preeminent Romanian scholar, Demetrius Cantemir (1673-1723). Cantemir's *History of the Othman Empire* was first written in Latin, and then translated into English in 1734-1735 by Nicolas Tindal. Tindal's version was then translated into French, German and other vernaculars and it remained the main European source-text on Turkish culture until the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century.

The Latin original was lost until 1984. Its discovery triggered immense surprise, since the Latin manuscript was so different from the English (and, of course, the other vernacular) version. At a first glance, Virgil Căndeă, the finder of the manuscript, concluded that Tindal's version was a remake, not a translation, since it dismissed about 20% of the work. But in stating these, Căndeă's approach based on modern views on translation.

In my presentation, I will attempt to analyse the more blatant differences between the Latin and the English version and to see whether relevance theory could explain Tindal's approach to translation. What was *relevant* for a Romanian historian, educated in a Greek-and-Turkish environment, might have not been *relevant* for a British historian in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. My analysis takes into account text-samples and is performed mostly at a stylistic level, since Tindal strived to eliminate the emotion-driven phrases from the text and to make it more "serious".

#### Sources:

- Cantemir, Dimitrie. 2001. *Incrementorum et decrementorum Aulae Othmannicae sive Aliothmannicae historiae a prima gentis origine ad nostra usque tempora deductae libri tres*, edited by D. Slușanschi. Timișoara: Amarcord
- Cantemir, Demetrius (1734-1735) *The history of the growth and decay of the Othman Empire*. Translated into English from the author's own manuscript by N. Tindal, London, printed for James, John and Paul Knapton, at the Crown in Ludgate Street, 2 vols.

#### Bibliography:

- Artowicz, E. 2008. Relevant translation of grammatical categories absent in the target language – a case study from Hungarian and Polish. In *Relevance Round Table I*, edited by E. Mioduszevska and A. Piskorska. Warsaw: Warsaw University Press, 7-22.
- Baker, M. 2000. Towards a methodology for investigating the style of a literary translator. *Target* 12, no. 2: 241-266.
- Bîrsan, C. 2005. *Dimitrie Cantemir și lumea islamică*. București: Editura Academiei Române.
- Gutt, E.-A. 1990. A theoretical account of translation – without a translation theory. *Target* 2: 135-164.
- . 1991. *Translation and relevance: Cognition and context*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Saldanha, G. 2011. Translator style: Methodological considerations. *The Translator: Studies in Intercultural Communication* 17, no. 1: 25-50.
- Sperber, D. and D. Wilson. 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Blackwell.



Uță Bărbulescu, O. 2011. *Latinis Litteris Operam Navare: Despre traducerea surselor latine și integrarea lor în „Istoria ieroglifică”*. București: Editura Universității din București.  
Venuti, L. 1995. *The translator's invisibility*. London: Routledge.

### **Agnieszka Walczak**

University of Warsaw, Poland  
agnieszka.a.walczak@gmail.com

## **Echoic irony in Philip Larkin's "Church Going" and "Water". A comparative analysis of Stanisław Barańczak's and Jacek Dehnel's translations of "Water" in the light of relevance theory**

The question of interpreting irony in the light of relevance theory has been raised by scholars such as D. Sperber, D. Wilson and C. Curco, who argued that, contrary to rhetorical tradition, irony is not based on meaning the opposite of what one utters but involves attributing the proposition expressed by the utterance to someone other than the speaker at the time of utterance, is echoic and the attitude in the "echoing" is one of dissociation from the beliefs echoed. My paper addresses the issue by quoting Philip Larkin's poems and two translations by Stanisław Barańczak and Jacek Dehnel. Specifically, I will analyze the importance of interpreting irony in the light of relevance theory in the poem "Church Going" and its use in the two translations of the poem "Water". I argue that the echoic character of irony in "Church Going" is vital to the poem's significance and dismissing irony as "the opposite of what the speaker means" leads to a simplistic interpretation. A comparative analysis of the two translations of the poem "Water" by Barańczak and Dehnel proves that the amount of irony in the translated texts largely depends on how many "utterances" in the poem are attributed to someone other than the speaker. Larkin's irony cannot be accounted for by a traditional rhetoric tradition since it is based on NOT saying the opposite of what is meant; it is the interplay between what is uttered, meant and understood that constitutes the meaning. Larkin uses the irony to express complicated thoughts that otherwise would require lengthy explanation. In conclusion, interpreting irony in the light of relevance theory helps shed some light on Larkin's intricate use of language.

### **Bibliography:**

- Curco, C. 2000. Irony: Negation, echo and metarepresentation. *Lingua* 110,  
Jarniewicz, J. 2006. *Larkin. Odsłuchiwanie wierszy*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak.  
Larkin, P. 1991. *44 wiersze*. Trans. by S. Barańczak. Kraków: ARKA.  
— . 2008. *Zebrane. Mniej oszukani, Wesela w Zielone Świątki i Wysokie okna*. Trans. by J. Dehnel. Wrocław: Biuro Literackie.  
Lodge, D. 1991. Philip Larkin. In *The modes of modern writing*. Edward Arnold.  
*Merriam-Webster's Advanced Learner's English Dictionary*.  
Motion, A. 1993. *Philip Larkin. A writer's life*. Faber and Faber.  
Sperber D. and D. Wilson. 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Szymańska, K. 2012. *Larkina portret zwielokrotniony. O dwóch polskich przekładach brytyjskiego poety*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper.

### **Ewa Wałaszewska**

University of Warsaw, Poland  
e.walaszewska@uw.edu.pl

## **Hedges and lexical concept adjustment**

Relevance theory (e.g. Sperber and Wilson [1986] 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2012) seems to provide a ready-made conceptual apparatus to describe properties of a group of expressions traditionally known as hedges (e.g. Lakoff 1973). In particular, the assumed structure of lexically encoded concepts, the formation of ad hoc concepts, and the conceptual-procedural distinction (e.g. Blakemore 1987) make it possible to re-describe and re-classify hedges in a consistent manner. The very existence of hedges follows naturally from fundamental assumptions of relevance theory, according to which communication is not a failsafe mechanism and speakers may want to direct hearers to the intended interpretation, also by employing special linguistic expressions whose

role is to guide hearers in the interpretation process. Hence, in relevance-theoretic terms, hedges may be regarded as linguistic expressions whose role boils down to indicating the need for adjusting lexically encoded concepts.

Since hedges form a rather heterogeneous group, in order to show how they influence ad hoc concept formation, a few of them are analysed in detail: *sort of*, *typical*, *regular* and *real*. The analyses presented in the paper show that while *sort of* instructs the hearer to form an ad hoc concept based on the broadening of the lexical material it precedes (e.g. Itani 1995; Andersen 2001; Miskovic-Lukovic 2009), *typical* leads the hearer to narrow the lexically encoded concept to its stereotypical or prototypical properties (Itani 1995). Hedges such as *regular* and *real* are claimed to signal the type of broadening observable in metaphorical statements. Thus, hedges may be re-classified according to what they signal: broadening (*sort of*, *regular*, *real*) or narrowing (*typical*). Furthermore, a comparison of *sort of* and *regular/real* reveals that metaphors apparently involve a different type of broadening from approximations. It seems that the proposed classification should be expanded to accommodate so-called ‘slack regulators’ (e.g. Lasersohn 1999) such as *exactly* (and possibly *very*), which may be claimed to encode a procedure to restrict the extent of broadening.

## References:

- Andersen, Gisle. 2001. *Pragmatic markers and sociolinguistic variation: A relevance-theoretic approach to the language of adolescents*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Blakemore, Diane. 1987. *Semantic constraints on relevance*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Itani, Reiko. 1995. A relevance-based analysis of Lakoffian hedges: *Sort of*, *a typical* and *technically*. *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* 7: 87-105.
- Lakoff, George. 1973. Hedges: A study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 2: 458-508.
- Lasersohn, Peter. 1999. Pragmatic halos. *Language* 75, no. 3: 522-551.
- Miskovic-Lukovic, Mirjana. 2009. *Is there a chance that I might kinda sort of take you out to dinner?: The role of the pragmatic particles kind of and sort of in utterance interpretation*. *Journal of Pragmatics* 41: 602-625.
- Sperber, Dan and Deirdre, Wilson. [1986] 1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber. 2012. *Meaning and relevance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## Jerzy Warakomski

NKJO Puławy, Poland  
my.name@tlen.pl

## Irony on the air

The speech event analysed had several editions over its forty years of existence, but its profile remained essentially the same. Most typically, it was a late-night talk show on a succession of British radio stations, chaired by a deliberately controversial host. As such, it fits well into a tradition of such programmes, developed first in the 1960s in the United States. By nature it is interactive, depending on listeners phoning in to air their opinions or problems, but the host’s personality usually dominates or even destroys the interaction. On occasion this is due to the host’s emotions getting out of hand, but on the whole it happens by design, for such is the programme’s trademark. The result is rather aptly summed up in a review: ‘This is probably the most fun talk show in the world, ever – discussing serious subjects in a light-hearted and tactless way!’ (see jameswhale.tripod.com/, accessed 14 June 2014). And, it has to be said, the converse is also the case: trivial topics are often elevated and elaborated beyond expectation.

All this both constitutes and contributes to a singular style of verbal performance in this speech event, much of which comes from humour. In a free-formula programme like that, entertainment is achieved by diverse means, but underlying a lot of it is irony. To a researcher of phatic phenomena this is a good opportunity to investigate its occurrence in the natural environment of informal interaction. To this end recordings were made of extended excerpts of the programme, followed by transcription of relevant passages, thus made available for more systematic analysis. This is designed as part of a broader undertaking, aimed at studying the achievement of relevance in the context of conversation with the radio. Suitably for the task, the conceptual background will be sought in Relevance Theory, perhaps for the first time confronted with a vast volume of naturally collected data, which it was this author’s good luck to gather.

Today’s language corpora are normally both assembled and analysed by computers – but how do you scan for samples of something as context-dependent as irony? Even the ironic tone of voice seems to have no



unequivocal support, and the only ironic letter font there can be is the post-analytical one. Interestingly, some sort of missing context can easily enough be supplied once we are confronted with an utterance and told it is ironic. Thus hardly any background will be needed for a handful of lines from the data to be identified as, respectively: mock praise (*That's a good name*), mock appreciation (*I could tell you were interested*), mock concern (*Life could stop still for that*), mock generosity (*You could do with fifty-four*) or even mock politeness (*It's your turn*). However, it is only the whole micro-situation which can give us the full flavour of the device deployed, and the statistical systematicity of such occurrences throughout the corpus that shows how irony is used in informal British English conversation.

### **Iwona Wiczak-Plisiecka**

University of Łódź, Poland  
wipiw@uni.lodz.pl

## **Legal language – amidst the literal and the metaphorical**

Typically, the language of the law is perceived as a consistent variety characterised by a strife for a high level of explicitness. However, law, being a product of culture, is itself metaphorical in nature. The concepts of law, even the simplest ones, such as “legal person”, heavily depend on metaphorical processes which are also important in the course of legal interpretation.

The paper aims to point to selected intricacies that the language of the law possesses and to show that typically reception of legal language expressions is relative to the level of expertise in the legal sphere. The differences can be best explained in relevance-theoretic terms with reference to the relative differences in processing effort and the dependent cognitive effect, which will naturally favour lawyers in legal encounters.

An additional point of interest is that the differences are in fact multifold. While lay people have difficulty in processing legal language, lawyers tend to disregard the metaphorical dimension of legal stylistics perceiving their language as simply literal, which gives rise to a different type of deficiency. As a result, legal language turns out to be “difficult” to both parties, the apparent insiders and outsiders. The difficulties are further aggravated in the context of searching for interlingual equivalence.

The discussion is based on the author's experience in translating *Professional Legal Ethics* (2013), a handbook for law students. It is also illustrated with data retrieved while working on project “Metaphor as a mechanism to understand language of law and legal language and to experience law (quoting examples of Polish language and legal language)” [“Metafora jako mechanizm rozumienia języka prawnego i prawniczego oraz doświadczania prawa na przykładzie polskiego języka prawnego i prawniczego”] (OSF, ID 220257, 2013/09/B/HS5/02529).

### **Samuel Zakowski**

Ghent University, Belgium  
Samuel.Zakowski@UGent.be

## **‘Here’s another hit – Barry Bonds’. Relevance theory & hip hop’s punch line flow**

In this paper, I look at the so-called ‘punch line flow’ in hip hop. This lyrical technique consists of a seemingly unproblematic pre-punch line part, a pause, and a punch line which induces a reinterpretation of the pre-punch line part. In the examples under discussion, this reinterpretation is based on homophony (1) or polysemy (2) – a ‘dormant’ sense of the element preceding the pause is activated due to the addition of the punch line.

- (1) The story of my life is to get the glory off the mics – Quincy. (Big Sean, *Supa Dupa*)
- (2) Here’s another hit – Barry Bonds. (Kanye West, *Barry Bonds*)

In the first example, ‘mics’ is first processed as shorthand for ‘microphones’, a metonymy for ‘musical career’ – this is the most relevant interpretation in the sense that it produces enough positive cognitive effects for very little effort in the given context (a song). However, after the addition of ‘Quincy’, it should also be parsed as ‘Mike’, referring to Michael Jackson – Quincy refers to Quincy Jones, Michael Jackson’s musical mentor. The first interpretation does not fit in with this new linguistic material, and should be adjusted to incorporate this second interpretation as well.



In the second example, ‘hit’ is first developed into ‘musical hit record’ – again, this is the most relevant interpretation in the context of a song. The addition of the punch line ‘Barry Bonds’, however, leads the hearer to the conclusion that ‘hit’ refers simultaneously to a more literal ‘hit’ – Barry Bonds is a baseball player who is very good at hitting the baseball. In this sense, then, the hearer is led up the garden path by the speaker. He exploits the inherent homophony or polysemy of a certain word and uses it to play on and with the hearer’s expectations.

By altering the contextual assumptions underlying the interpretation of the pre-punch line part of the line, the punch line incites the construction of an ad hoc concept in the audience’s consciousness (MICS\* or HIT\*), which covers two senses of the same word (in the case of polysemy) or two interpretations of the same phonetic sequence (in the case of homophony). The second interpretation, moreover, is induced only by the punch line. In that sense, both Big Sean and Kanye West assume that this hint is enough to lead the hearer to the speaker-meant interpretation; hence, most of the interpretive work is left to the hearer.

#### **Selected references:**

- Díaz-Pérez, F. J. 2012. The use of wordplay in advertisements published in men’s magazines. A comparative study in the UK and Spain. *Estudios Ingleses de la Universidad Complutense* 20: 11-36.
- Solska, A. 2012. Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure and processing multiple meanings in paradigmatic puns. In *Relevance theory: More than understanding*, edited by E. Wałaszewska and A. Piskorska. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 167-182.
- Wilson, D. and R. Carston. 2006. Metaphor, relevance and the ‘emergent property’ issue. *Mind & Language* 21, no. 3: 404-433.

#### **Vladimir Žegarac**

University of Bedfordshire, UK  
vladimir.zegarac@beds.ac.uk

#### **Joanna Bhatti**

University of Bedfordshire, UK  
joanna.bhatti@beds.ac.uk

### **Modern pragmatics as the literary theory theory**

In modern pragmatics the comprehension of a communicative act is standardly described as a form of mind-reading: the hearer or reader interprets the communicative act by making inferences about the communicator’s likely informative intention in producing the act. The central question for modern pragmatics is: *How is it possible for people to read each other’s minds in communicating (routinely and effortlessly) more information than they put into words?* The answers proposed by Paul Grice in the mid 1960s (reprinted in Grice 1989) and Sperber and Wilson’s (1986, 1995) theory of relevance are similar in one important respect: both rest on the view that the participants in a communication event presume that the production and the comprehension of communicative acts are guided by some norms and principles which streamline comprehension is a systematic and predictable (i.e. rational) way. A psychologically plausible inferential model of communication of this type must also include an account of the cognitive mechanism(s) which make possible the attribution of intentions of the participants in communication to each other. In other words, we need to have an account of the mental mechanisms that make mind-reading possible. By far the most influential hypothesis is that our intuitive understanding of mental phenomena is made possible by a “folk” theory of mind which is innately specified but is shaped by enculturation. The hypothesis that people have a “folk” theory of mind is known as the ‘theory-theory’.

In this paper we challenge some widely held assumptions about the relation between Relevance-theoretic pragmatics and literary analysis by focusing on two issues. We argue that literary (or aesthetic) effects are not communicated. Rather, they are the side effects of cognitive (i.e. contextual) effects, which are communicated. In terms of Speech Act Theory (Searle 1969) literary (i.e. aesthetic) effects are best described as affective-perlocutionary effects of literary texts as illocutionary acts.

The first part of our presentation questions the view sometimes expressed within Relevance Theory that literary (aesthetic, affective) effects are communicated (see Pilkington 2000; Moeschler, 2009). In the second part we take issue with the assumptions made in literary theories which either explicitly deny or simply ignore the role of the recognition of informative intentions in the interpretation of literary texts. Our argument is



supported by a consideration of structuralist, poststructuralist, psychoanalytic, feminist, Marxist and historicist readings of a single literary text: ‘Snowed Up: A Mistletoe Story’ by William Jeffries (Wolfreys and Baker eds, 1996). We try to make a case for the view that the interpretation of a literary text starts with the attribution to the author of a sophisticated intention (which we call ‘literary intention’) and that literary theories are best seen as each providing different sets of ‘tools’ for sophisticated interpretations of literary texts. In particular, the readings of Jeffries’ short story from the perspectives of different literary theories provide ample evidence for the view that these sophisticated interpretations are in fact guided by assumptions about the author’s intentions.

## Edyta Żralka

University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland  
ezralka@wp.pl

### Principles of “Newspeak” in the Polish translations of British and American press articles under the communist rule

In the People’s Republic of Poland, due to the control of media and other means of verbal communication by the censorship organ - *Główny Urząd Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk* (Main Office for Control of the Press, Publications and Public Performances) and its specially trained staff, translations of Western sources concerning the Polish situation were in fact either banned or had to undergo the process of censors’ corrections or self-verification on the part of a translator. In fact, what translators did, was often like a double translation process – first the proper one, and then doing a sort of retranslation, namely rewriting the message so as to avoid all the controversial contents to satisfy the authorities having power. It practically meant following the model of communication imposed by communist activists and controlled by the censors, namely accepting a specific style of communist discourse, referred to as “Newspeak”. The idea and the whole process described seem associated with self-translation.

As was observed in the author’s research, which is a comparative study of original articles from British and American press concerning the situation in Poland under the communist rule, reached in the British Library, London, and their translations into Polish published in *Forum* magazine, these alterations of the original message are quite common cases. To satisfy the requirements of communist authorities and follow the principles of the created stylistic pattern of political discourse translators used to refer to strategies changing the real message of original articles. Distortion and manipulation seem to be obvious consequences of translational process. This is the author’s objective to prove in the paper, along with the presentation of all principles judging the translation according to the Relevance Theory, the same as strategies and techniques used by translators with examples and the description of background reasons for such a situation.

#### References:

- Barnes, John. 2004. From state monopoly to a free market of ideas? Censorship in Poland, 1976–1989. In *Censorship & cultural regulation in the Modern Age*, edited by B.Müller. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Bagiński, Kazimierz. 1981. *Cenzura w Polsce*. Warszawa: Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza.
- Bogucka, Maria. 2000. Życie z cenzurą. In *Cenzura w PRL: relacje historyków*, edited by Z. Romek. Warszawa: Neriton, Instytut Historii PAN, 45-50.
- Borejsza, Jerzy W., Klaus Ziemer and Magdalena Hulas, eds. 2006. *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in Europe legacies and lessons from the twentieth century*. New York/Oxford.
- Bralczyk, Jerzy. 2001. *O języku polskiej propagandy politycznej lat siedemdziesiątych*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio.
- . 2003. *O języku polskiej polityki lat osiemdziesiątych i dziewięćdziesiątych*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio.
- . 2007. O języku polskiej propagandy politycznej lat siedemdziesiątych. In *O języku propagandy i polityki*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, 11-225.
- Chilton, Paul. 2004. *Analysing political discourse. Theory and practice*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
- Degen, Dorota and Marcin Żynda, eds. 2012. *Nie po myśli władzy. Studia nad cenzurą i zakresem wolności słowa na ziemiach polskich od wieku XIX do czasów współczesnych*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika.
- Dijk, Teun A. van. 1998. *Ideology*. London: Sage.
- Forum Sierpień ’80. 1980. *Cenzura*. Warszawa: Zeszyty Forum Sierpień ’80.
- Geis, Michael L. 1987. *The language of politics*. New York, Berlin, Heidelberg, London Paris Tokyo: Springer-Verlag.

- Hass, Ludwik. 2000. Cenzura i inne mechanizmy sterowania historykami w latach PRL. In *Cenzura w PRL: relacje historyków*, edited by Z. Romek. Warszawa: Neriton, Instytut Historii PAN, 77-97.
- Hodge, Robert and Gunther Kress. 1993. *Language as ideology*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Kaczyńska, Elżbieta. 2000. Relacja o kontaktach z cenzurą. In *Cenzura w PRL: relacje historyków*, edited by Z. Romek. Warszawa: Neriton, Instytut Historii PAN, 109-112.
- Kersten, Krystyna. 2000. Moje doświadczenia z cenzurą. In *Cenzura w PRL: relacje historyków*, edited by Z. Romek. Warszawa: Neriton, Instytut Historii PAN, 121-125.
- Kula, Marcin. 2000. List do Prof.dr.hab. Stanisława Byliny. In *Cenzura w PRL: relacje historyków*, edited by Z. Romek. Warszawa: Neriton, Instytut Historii PAN, 127-128.
- Łętowski, Maciej. 2010. *Gdy żyliśmy ustrój I godziliśmy w sojusze. Cenzura prasowa w PRL na przykładzie katolickiego tygodnika społecznego „Ład”*. Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL.
- Mueller, Claus and Carol Coe Conway. 1974. *The politics of communication. A study in the political sociology of language, socialization, and legitimation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Müller, Beate. 2004. *Censorship & cultural regulation in the Modern Age*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Niczow, Aleksandar. 1982. *Black book of Polish censorship*. South Bend: And Books.
- Osadnik, Waław M. and Piotr Fast, eds. 2004. *Language, Politics, Culture*. Częstochowa: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Lingwistycznej.
- Pawlicki, Aleksander. 2001. *Kompletna szarość. Cenzura w latach 1965-1972. Instytucja i ludzie*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio.
- Radzikowska, Zofia. 1990. *Z historii walki o wolność słowa w Polsce (cenzura w latach 1981-1987)*. Kraków: Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych Universitas.
- Romek, Zbigniew, ed. 2000. *Cenzura w PRL. Relacje historyków*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Neriton, Instytut Historii PAN.
- . 2000. Kłopoty z cenzurą. Kilka refleksji zamiast wstępu. In *Cenzura w PRL: relacje historyków*, edited by Z. Romek. Warszawa: Neriton, Instytut Historii PAN.
- . 2010. *Cenzura a nauka historyczna w Polsce 1944-1970*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Neriton. Instytut Historii PAN.
- Saussure, Louis de and Peter Schulz, eds. 2005. *Manipulation and ideologies in the twentieth century. Discourse, language, mind*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Siuda, Maria M. 2009. Ingerencje cenzorskie jako narzędzie reglamentowania treści prasowych (na przykładzie prasy kieleckiej). In *Rocznik Bibliologiczno-Prasoznawczy*, tom 1/12, 69-99.  
[http://www.ujk.edu.pl/ibib/studia/pdf/12/ingerencje\\_cenzorskie.pdf](http://www.ujk.edu.pl/ibib/studia/pdf/12/ingerencje_cenzorskie.pdf) (5 January, 2014)
- Skorupa, Ewa, ed. 2010. *Przeskoczyć tę studnię strachu. Autor i dzieło a cenzura PRL*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
- Tymoczko, Maria and Edwin Gentzler, eds. 2002. *Translation and power*. Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press.



## List of participants

- Keiko Abe**, Matsuyama Shinonome Junior College, Japan  
naoshige@tau.e-catv.ne.jp
- Joanna Bhatti**, University of Bedfordshire, UK  
joanna.bhatti@beds.ac.uk
- Magdalena Biegajło**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
magdalena.biegajlo@gmail.com
- Regina Blass**, Africa International University and University of North Dakota, US  
regina\_blass@sil.org
- Silvia Bonacchi**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
s.bonacchi@uw.edu.pl
- Kaja Borthen**, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim  
kaja.borthen@ntnu.no
- Katarzyna Bromberek-Dyzman**, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland  
kasia.dyzman@wa.amu.edu.pl
- Sarah Casson**, King's College, London, UK and SIL International  
sarah\_casson@sil.org
- Katarzyna Cioś**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
katarzynaewa.cios@gmail.com
- Billy Clark**, Middlesex University, UK  
B.Clark@mdx.ac.uk
- Herbert L. Colston**, University of Alberta, Canada  
colston@ualberta.ca
- Kamila Dębowska-Kozłowska**, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland  
kamila@wa.amu.edu.pl
- Ewa Franus**  
evev@hetnet.nl
- Gabriela Gancowska**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
gabra@10g.pl
- Alison Hall**, University College London, UK  
a.hall@ucl.ac.uk
- Agata Hacia**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
agata.hacia@uw.edu.pl
- Rebecca Jackson**, University of Salford, UK  
r.c.jackson1@edu.salford.ac.uk
- Maria Jodłowiec**, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland  
maria.jodlowiec@uj.edu.pl
- Stephen Jones**, Rochester Institute of Technology, US  
StephenPerryJones@gmail.com
- Marta Kisielewska-Krysiuk**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
m.kisielewska@uw.edu.pl
- Jadwiga Linde-Usiekniewicz**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
jlinde@uw.edu.pl
- Beate Lubberger**, University of North Dakota, US  
belubberger@gmail.com
- Witold Milczarek**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
witold.milczarek@gmail.com
- Ewa Mioduszevska**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
e.mioduszevska@uw.edu.pl
- Chisako Nakamura**, Kobe University, Japan  
chisakoiga@yahoo.co.jp
- Paulina Nalewajko**, University of Social Sciences and Humanities (SWPS), Warsaw, Poland  
pnalewajko1@swps.edu.pl
- Anabella-Gloria Niculescu-Gorpin**, Romanian Academy and University of Bucharest, Romania  
anabellaniculescu@hotmail.com
- Ewa Nowik-Dziewicka**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
e.nowik@uw.edu.pl



**Clene Nyiramahoro**, Africa International University, Nairobi and SIL International  
cnyiramahoro@yahoo.com

**Minako O'Hagan**, Dublin City University, Ireland

**Manuel Padilla Cruz**, University of Seville, Spain  
mpadillacruz@us.es

**Agnieszka Piskorska**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
a.piskorska@uw.edu.pl

**Maria Angeles Ruiz-Moneva**, University of Zaragoza, Spain  
mruiz@unizar.es

**Ryoko Sasamoto**, Dublin City University, Ireland  
ryoko.sasamoto@dcu.ie

**Daniel J. Sax**, Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities (SWPS), Poland  
sax.dan@gmail.com

**Kate Scott**, Kingston University, London, UK  
kate.scott@kingston.ac.uk

**Agnieszka Solska**, University of Silesia, Poland  
agnieszka.solska@us.edu.pl, agnpaul@hotmail.com

**Robert Stock**, University of East Anglia, UK  
R.Stock@uea.ac.uk

**Cláudia Strey**, PUCRS, Brazil  
claudiastrey@gmail.com

**Izabela Szymańska**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
i.szymanska@uw.edu.pl

**Seiji Uchida**, Nara University, Japan  
s-uchida@gaia.eonet.ne.jp

**Monica Vasileanu**, The University of Bucharest, Romania  
monica.vasileanu@gmail.com

**Agnieszka Walczak**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
agnieszka.a.walczak@gmail.com

**Ewa Wałaszewska**, University of Warsaw, Poland  
e.walaszewska@uw.edu.pl

**Jerzy Warakowski**, NKJO Puławy, Poland  
my.name@tlen.pl

**Deirdre Wilson**, Department of Linguistics, University College London, UK and CSMN, Oslo, Norway  
deirdre.wilson@ucl.ac.uk

**Iwona Witzczak-Plisiecka**, University of Łódź, Poland  
wipiw@uni.lodz.pl

**Samuel Zakowski**, Ghent University, Belgium  
Samuel.Zakowski@UGent.be


**Joanna Zaucha**, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, Warsaw, Poland  
joanna.zaucha@interia.pl

**Vladimir Žegarac**, University of Bedfordshire, UK  
vladimir.zegarac@beds.ac.uk

**Edyta Żralka**, University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland  
ezralka@wp.pl



## Conference venue



### **The University of Warsaw campus**

ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28  
00-927 Warszawa

#### **The Old Library**

(plenaries and paper sessions)

#### **Kazimierzowski Palace**

(lunches and conference dinner)